In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:  Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information by Hoffman, Sharona & Podgurski, Andy
1IN SICKNESS, HEALTH, AND CYBERSPACE:  PROTECTING THE 
SECURITY  
OF ELECTRONIC PRIVATE HEALTH INFORMATION 
 
Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski 
The electronic processing of health information provides considerable benefits to 
patients and health care providers at the same time that it creates serious risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data.  The Internet provides a conduit for 
rapid and uncontrolled dispersion and trafficking of illicitly-obtained private health 
information, with far-reaching consequences to the unsuspecting victims.  In order to 
address such threats to electronic private health information, the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services enacted the HIPAA Security Rule, which thus far has 
received little attention in the legal literature.  This article presents a critique of the 
Security Rule from both legal and technical perspectives.  We argue that the Rule suffers 
from several defects relating to its narrow definition of “covered entities,” to the limited 
scope of information it allows data subjects to obtain about their health information, to 
the vagueness and incompleteness of the Rule’s standards and implementation 
specifications, and to the lack of a private cause of action.  The article  
explores the difficult problem of crafting static regulations to adequately address rapidly  
changing computer and communications technologies and associated security threats to 
private health information.  In addition, it develops detailed recommendations for 
improving safeguards for electronically processed health records.  
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I
INTRODUCTION 
 
The electronic processing of health data provides invaluable benefits to patients 
and health care providers. These include speed and flexibility of information processing, 
retrieval and communication; long-term cost savings due to increased efficiency; and the 
availability of powerful computational techniques that can contribute to improved patient 
outcomes.1 Unfortunately, some of these same attributes enable the operation of a market 
in illicitly-obtained private health information.  The Internet provides a nearly ideal 
channel for trafficking in such information, since it permits the information to be 
transmitted anywhere in the world quickly, cheaply, and with relatively little risk of 
detection.2 This article will analyze the threats to electronic health records and the 
deficiencies of regulations that have been enacted to address them.  It will also develop 
recommendations for improving safeguards for these records.  
The risks associated with the electronic storage and transmission of personal 
information in general and health data in particular are indeed grave.  A New Year’s Day 
2006 article in the New York Times included the following statement:  
 
Every week seems to bring reports of a new breach of the computer networks that 
contain our most intimate personal information.  Scores of companies – including 
Bank of America, MasterCard, ChoicePoint and Marriott International – have 
admitted to security lapses that exposed millions of people’s financial information 
to potential abuse by identity thieves.3
1 See Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health 
Records, __ U. ILL. L. REV. __ , 2 (forthcoming 2007) (discussing the advantages of electronic health 
records). 
2 See Young B. Choi et al., Challenges Associated with Privacy in Health Care Industry:  Implementation 
of HIPAA and the Security Rules, 30 J. MED. SYS. 57, 60 (2006) (stating that private information can be 
distributed worldwide within seconds). 
3 John Schwartz, What Are You Lookin’ At? N.Y. TIMES, January 1, 2006, at Section 4, 1. 
3Another article reported that between February and June of 2005 alone, 
“businesses, universities, and government agencies lost . . . ten million records” and that 
according to a Gallup poll conducted in August of 2005, one out of five Americans 
experienced identity theft.4 In May of 2006, a burglary at the home of a Department of 
Veterans Affairs employee resulted in the well-publicized theft of discs containing 
names, birthdates, and Social Security numbers of as many as 26.5 million military 
veterans.5 Even private wireless cell phone use is vulnerable to public disclosure.  
Reportedly, dozens of internet-based companies sell information concerning calls made 
and received by cell phone users, which they obtain by posing as customers and asking 
for copies of bills.6
The confidentiality of personal health information appears to be compromised 
with disturbing frequency.  A report that focused on discarded hard drives and disk 
sanitization practices disclosed that in August 2002, the United States Veterans 
Administration Medical Center in Indianapolis sold or donated 139 of its old computers 
without removing confidential information contained on their hard drives, including the 
names of veterans who had AIDS and mental illnesses.7 An earlier paper published by 
the British Medical Association reports numerous instances of private health information 
abuse, including the case of a banker who served on a state health commission and 
obtained a list of all cancer patients in his state, which he used to call in the individuals’ 
loans.8 On April 26, 2006 Aetna announced that a laptop computer containing personal 
information concerning 38,000 consumers had been stolen,9 and on May 12, 2006, a 
newspaper article reported that a computer breach may have led to the theft of personal 
information relating to 60,000 patients who visited Ohio University’s health center.10 
Other reported incidents include an inadvertent Internet postings of identifying 
information and details of the sex lives of 90 psychotherapy patients, an inadvertent 
posting of sixty children’s psychological records on the University of Montana’s website, 
a hacker’s illegal downloading of thousands of patients’ medical files from a university 
medical center, and the stealing of health information belonging to military personnel and 
their families from a contractor’s database.11 
4 Daniel B. Prieto, Data Mine, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 2005, at 17. 
5 David Stout, Personal Data of 26.5 Million Veterans Stolen, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2006, at __. 
6 Sheryl Harris, Are your cell phone records safe? THE PLAIN DEALER, January 14, 2006 at A1 (reporting 
that one company charges only $100 for information about a customer’s last 100 calls). 
7 Simson L. Garfinkel & Abhi Shelat, Remembrance of Data Passed:  A Study of Disk Sanitization 
Practices, 1 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY (2003), available at 
http://www.computer.org/security/v1n1/garfinkel.htm. 
8 Ross J. Anderson, Security in Clinical Information Systems, British Medical Association (January 4, 
1996), pp. 4-6, available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/policy11/policy11.html, citing RMs need 
to safeguard computerized patient records to protect hospitals, 9 HOSPITAL RISK MANAGEMENT 129-140 
(1993). 
9 See Statement of Aetna CEO and President Ronald A. Williams on Data Security available at 
http://www.aetna.com/news/2006/pr_20060426.htm.
10 Jennifer Gonzalez, 3rd computer breach at OU within 3 weeks, THE PLAIN DEALER, May 12, 2006, at A1. 
11 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 54-55 (2004). See also Nicolas P. Terry, To HIPAA, a Son: 
Assessing the Technical, Conceptual, and Legal Frameworks for Patient Safety Information, __ WIDENER 
L. REV. __ (2006) available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=770784 (describing other examples of 
dysfunctional “privacy and security systems”). 
4Why would anyone want to obtain the health information of others?  The reasons 
are numerous.  Private health information can be useful to employers who wish to hire 
and retain the healthiest employees,12 to lenders and other businesses with a stake in 
individuals’ financial futures and thus in their health status,13 to drug companies that wish 
to influence doctors’ prescribing decisions,14 to advertisers and marketers who wish to 
tailor their material for particular audiences,15 to health insurers making eligibility and 
premium rate decisions concerning individual insurance policies, and even to educational 
institutions that might wish to recruit and accept students with the greatest potential for 
success and longevity.  In a world in which electronic health information can be easily 
stolen or accessed, it could also become increasingly of interest to blackmailers and other 
criminals.16 For example, after a computer was stolen from a general medical practice, 
two prominent women received letters from blackmailers who threatened to publicize the 
fact that the women had had abortions.17 Even potential romantic partners who are 
looking for a low-risk mate might try to obtain personal health information if it were 
easily accessible. 
Trafficking in personal health information poses a significant risk to the public.  
Once the data is dispersed on the Internet, it becomes available to anyone who is willing 
to pay for it,18 and it cannot be expunged.  Consequently, the harm to an individual from 
illicit or accidental disclosure of health information is potentially unlimited.  It is quite 
possible for the affected individual to remain unaware of the disclosure and its 
 
12 Anderson, supra note 8 at 5 (reporting that as of 1995 “over half of America’s largest 500 companies 
admitted using health records to make hiring and other personnel decisions”).  It should be noted, however, 
that these health records were most likely lawfully obtained since the Americans with Disabilities Act 
permits medical testing of applicants and employees, with some limitations, though it forbids 
discrimination against qualified employees with disabilities.  42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), (d) (2000).  Employees 
who are sick or vulnerable to illness are often unappealing to employers because they can cause 
absenteeism, productivity, scheduling, and morale problems in the workplace and can raise health 
insurance costs.  Questions concerning the meaning of the terms “qualified” and “disability” and thus, the 
ADA’s scope of coverage, have generated considerable litigation.  See generally, Sharona Hoffman, 
Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1213 (2003).  
13 Anderson, supra note 8 at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to trade 
health records). 
14 Id. at 5 (stating that a US drug company purchased a health systems company and obtained a prescription  
database for 56 million people, which it was planning to search for individuals whose prescriptions 
suggested that they suffered from depression and could benefit from Prozac, a drug produced by the 
company).  See also Stephanie Saul, Doctors Object to Gathering of Drug Data, N. Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, 
at __ (describing computerized records with information concerning physicians and the drugs they 
prescribe that are used by drug sales representatives to influence doctors to write more prescriptions for 
drugs produced by their companies or fewer prescriptions of a competitor’s drugs); Robert Steinbrook, For 
Sale:  Physicians’ Prescribing Data, 354 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 2745 (2006) (reporting that during the last 
two decades, health care information companies have routinely purchased electronic prescription records 
from pharmacies and elsewhere, which they then sold to drug manufacturers). 
15 Prieto, supra note __, at 18 (asserting that “[a]s advertisers have sought greater return on their dollar, 
they are increasingly relying on personal data to target ads” based on particular attributes); Terry, supra 
note __, at __ (stating that PHI is “valuable for secondary uses” such as marketing). 
16 Anderson, supra note __, at 5; COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD NATIONAL 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, FOR THE RECORD: PROTECTING ELECTRONIC HEALTH INFORMATION 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter FOR THE RECORD] stating that hackers may penetrate computerized systems to steal data, 
destroy it, or damage the system.). 
17 Anderson, supra note 8, at 5. 
18 See Id. at 6 (reporting that a network is being built by a credit reference agency to trade health records.). 
5consequences,19 and it may be difficult or impossible to establish how an apparent 
disclosure actually occurred.  Loss or corruption of health data can also require the 
duplication of painful medical tests or even cause serious and life-threatening medical 
errors. 
Americans are aware of these dangers.  A 2005 National Consumer Health 
Privacy Survey, which queried two-thousand people, revealed that sixty-seven percent of 
respondents were “somewhat” or “very concerned” about the confidentiality of their 
medical records.20 Furthermore, thirteen percent of respondents claimed that they had 
attempted to protect their own privacy by avoiding medical tests or visits to their regular 
physicians, asking doctors to distort diagnoses, or paying for tests out-of-pocket so that 
no medical documentation would be sent to insurance companies.21 
In order to address the threats to data security associated with the electronic 
storage and transmission of private health information, the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services enacted the Security Rule under the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).22 The HIPAA Security Rule, which became 
effective on April 20, 2005 for most covered entities,23 delineates administrative, 
physical, and technical safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of electronic protected health information (PHI).  Under the Rule, PHI includes 
“individually identifiable health information” that is electronically or otherwise 
transmitted or maintained.24 “Covered entities” include health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and health care providers who transmit health information 
electronically.25 The Security Rule is part of the HIPAA Privacy Rule established in the 
HIPAA privacy regulations,26 which were promulgated pursuant to HIPAA’s statutory 
authority.27 
19 See Prieto, supra note __, at 17 (stating that the average victim becomes aware of identity theft only after 
fourteen months, but in some cases, discovering the crime takes ten years).  The article does not 
specifically address the theft of PHI, which could be hidden more easily since the consumer will not see 
suspicious charges on her credit card or tell-tale credit reports. 
20 Lynne “Sam” Bishop et al., National Consumer Health Privacy Survey 2005:  Executive Summary,
California Health Care Foundation 3 (Nov. 2005). 
21 Id. at 4. 
22 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.302 – 164.318 (2005).  See also Security and Electronic Signature Standards, 63 Fed. 
Reg. 43242 (1998) (providing background concerning the Security Rule’s purpose). 
23 45 C.F.R. § 164.318 (2005).  Small health plans were given an extended adjustment period and were 
required to comply with the rule by April 20, 2006. 
24 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
25 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005).  A health care clearinghouse is defined as:  
a public or private entity, including a billing service, repricing company, community health 
management information system or community health information system, and ‘value-added’ 
networks and switches, that . . . 
 (1) Processes or facilitates the processing of health information received from another 
entity in a nonstandard format or containing nonstandard data content into standard data elements 
or a standard transaction. 
 (2)  Receives a standard transaction from another entity and processes or facilitates the 
processing of health information into nonstandard format or nonstandard data content for the 
receiving entity. 
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
26 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101-164.534 (2005). 
27 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-8 (2000). 
6Many have criticized a variety of aspects of the HIPAA Privacy Rule28 but few 
have focused specifically on the regulations’ Security Rule. It is our view that the HIPAA 
Security Rule has serious deficiencies that hinder its efficacy as a mechanism to impede 
the operation of a market in illicitly obtained PHI.  These deficiencies are of four 
principal types.  First, the HIPAA statute and thus the Security Rule do not address 
trafficking in private health information by businesses and individuals outside of the 
health industry, such as employers, marketers, and lenders that are not “covered 
entities.”29 Consequently, these parties are permitted to handle health data without 
restriction under HIPAA.  Second, while the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients to 
inspect and copy their PHI,30 it does not enable individuals to establish the provenance of 
the data or to verify how the information was used.31 Third, the HIPAA Security Rule 
gives covered entities an excessive amount of discretion in deciding what implementation 
specifications they will address and how they will do so, and many of its standards and 
implementation specifications lack sufficient detail and specificity.32 As a result, careless 
or unscrupulous covered entities are very likely to become the main source of illicitly 
obtained PHI.  Furthermore, well-meaning but resource-poor covered entities that cannot 
develop sophisticated expertise with respect to computer security technology are given 
insufficient guidance as to how to achieve compliance with the Security Rule.  Fourth, 
the HIPAA privacy regulations, including the Security Rule, do not establish a private 
cause of action for aggrieved individuals.33 Thus, the regulations’ deterrence and 
remedial powers are significantly diminished by insufficient enforcement mechanisms. 
To address these deficiencies, we propose a detailed set of recommendations.  We 
acknowledge the challenge of crafting static regulations for an area that is by nature 
dynamic because both computer technology and security threats are continually 
changing.  We also recognize the potential tension between patients’ need for privacy 
safeguards and business’ need for efficient and profitable operations.  We have 
considered the implications of our proposal in a variety of circumstances and have 
evaluated them through detailed examples.  Our recommendations include:  1) expanding 
the definition of “covered entity” to include any person who knowingly stores or 
transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any business 
purpose related to the substance of such information; 2) broadening the right of access to 
 
28 See SOLOVE, supra note __, at 70 (stating that the HIPAA regulations have apparently pleased nobody” 
since health care providers “complain that the regulations are too complicated, cumbersome, and expensive 
to follow” and privacy advocates “find the regulations weak and ineffective.”);  Pew Internet & American 
Life Project, Exposed Online:  Why the new federal health privacy regulation doesn’t offer much protection 
to Internet users iii (November 2001) available at http://www.healthprivacy.org. (discussing the fact that 
many health-related websites are not covered entities).  
29 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (3) (2005) (defining a “covered entity” as a “health plan,” “health care 
clearinghouse,” or “health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in 
connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”) 
30 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2005) (establishing that an “individual has a right of access to inspect and 
obtain a copy of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set”). 
31 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524 (2005). 
32 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.30(b) (entitled “Flexibility of approach,” the provision establishes that “[c]overed 
entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately 
implement the standards and implementation specifications” of the Security Rule). 
33 Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace:  The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the Common Law, 33 
RUTGERS L.J. 617, 618 (2002). 
7PHI so that individuals can obtain information concerning its provenance and uses; 3) 
revising several of the Rule’s provisions to provide further detail and guidance and 
establishing mechanisms that will facilitate HIPAA Security Rule compliance; and 4) 
adding a private cause of action to the law’s enforcement scheme.    While we focus our 
critique on the Security Rule, some of our recommendations, such as changes in statutory 
definitions and scope, necessarily would extend to the Privacy Rule as a whole. 
The remainder of this Article will proceed as follows.  Part II describes the 
relevant Security Rule provisions.  Part III critiques the Rule and exposes its weaknesses.  
Part IV constitutes the recommendations section in which we detail methods for 
enhancing PHI security. 
II 
THE HIPAA SECURITY RULE 
 
The HIPAA Security Rule establishes general security requirements and provides 
implementers with broad discretion in choosing appropriate technologies to implement 
the standards.34 One of the Rule’s guiding principles is “technological neutrality,” an 
approach based on the belief that regulators should not dictate the use of specific 
technologies, which may be inappropriate in particular settings or may be superseded by 
improved technologies.35 It is clear from the public comments received by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) to the initial, proposed version of the 
Security Rule that industry strongly favored such discretion.36 
A. HIPAA Security Requirements 
The Security Rule establishes four general requirements.  Covered entities must:  
1) ensure the “confidentiality, integrity, and availability” of electronic health information 
that they produce, obtain, maintain, or transmit; 2) protect the data against reasonably 
anticipated threats to its security or integrity; 3) safeguard against impermissible use or 
disclosure of the information; and 4) ensure that their employees comply with the Rule.37 
Covered entities may choose the means by which to “reasonably and appropriately” 
implement the Rule’s standards, so long as they consider their size, complexity, 
 
34 45 C.F.R.§§ 164.302 – 164.318.  See also Health Insurance Reform:  Security Standards; Final Rule, 68 
Fed. Reg. 8336 (2003) (stating that the final rule was written “to frame the standards in terms that are as 
generic as possible and which, generally speaking, may be met through various approaches or 
technologies”). 
35 See Health Insurance Reform:  Security Standards; Final Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 8335 (2003) (describing the 
drafters’ “basic assumptions that the entities affected by this regulation are so varied in terms of installed 
technology, size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossible to dictate a specific solution or set 
of solutions that would be useable by all covered entities.”). 
36 Id. (stating that “[m]any commenters also supported the concept of technological neutrality, which would 
afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solutions and to adopt new technology over 
time.”).  See also id. at 8336 (explaining that numerous commentators asserted that “the security standards 
should not be overly prescriptive because the speed with which technology is evolving could make specific 
requirements obsolete and might in fact deter technological progress.”). 
37 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2005).  Permissible and impermissible uses of private health information are 
described in Subpart E of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500 – 164.534 (2005). 
8capabilities, and technical infrastructure in making their decisions along with the costs of 
implementation and the risks of security breaches.38 
The HIPAA Security Rule features “standards” and “implementation 
specifications” that provide instructions concerning how to fulfill the obligations outlined 
in the standards.  There are two types of implementation specifications:  required and 
addressable.39 Required implementation specifications are mandatory.40 By contrast, 
implementers may respond to an addressable implementation specification in one of three 
ways: 1) by implementing it; 2) by implementing an “equivalent alternative measure”; or 
3) by doing neither because implementation would not be “reasonable and appropriate.”41 
A covered entity that does not implement an implementation specification must 
document its justification for not doing so,42 and all covered entities must review their 
compliance and modify their security measures, as needed.43 
1. Administrative Safeguards 
Several required implementation specifications are intended to provide 
administrative safeguards.44 These are:  risk analysis and risk management practices, the 
establishment of sanctions for non-compliant employees, and information system activity 
reviews.45 Covered entities also must identify a “security official” who is responsible for 
compliance with the Security Rule and establish procedures whereby only authorized 
individuals have access to electronic protected health information.46 In order to achieve 
workforce security, a covered entity should implement authorization and supervision 
standards, workforce clearance procedures, and termination of authorization procedures, 
but these are considered “addressable” implementation specifications.47 
In addition, covered entities should implement a security awareness and training 
program for its workforce and implement measures such as security reminders, 
mechanisms that protect against malicious software, log-in monitoring, and password 
management.48 The Security Rule mandates provision of response and reporting 
mechanisms for security incidents49 and contingency plans that focus on data backup, 
disaster recovery, emergency mode operation, testing and revision procedures, and 
analysis of the criticality of the affected data and applications.50 It also instructs that 
covered entities should perform periodic evaluations of their compliance51 and may enter 
 
38 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b) (2005). 
39 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d) (2005). 
40 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(2) (2005). 
41 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3) (2005). 
42 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) (2005). 
43 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(e) (2005). 
44 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a) (2005). 
45 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii) (2005). 
46 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(2)-(3)(i) (2005). 
47 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(3)(ii) (2005). 
48 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(5) (2005).  These are addressable implementation specifications. 
49 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(6) (2005). 
50 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(7) (2005).  The development of testing and revision procedures and applications 
and data criticality analysis are addressable implementation specifications.  The other safeguards are 
required. 
51 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(8) (2005). 
9into written contracts or other arrangements with business associates to handle electronic 
protected health information, so long as the associates provide satisfactory assurances 
that they will appropriately safeguard the data.52 The Security Rule, however, does not 
apply with respect to the transmission of electronic protected health information to 
another health care provider who is treating the patient, to a group health plan sponsor, or 
to agencies determining eligibility for government programs providing public benefits.53 
2. Physical Safeguards 
The HIPAA Security Rule next establishes physical safeguards aimed at thwarting 
unauthorized access to electronic information systems and the facilities in which they are 
housed while ensuring access to authorized personnel.54 This sub-section describes 
several “addressable” implementation specifications, which include designing 
contingency operations, facility security plans, and access control and validation 
procedures and maintaining records concerning repairs and modifications to security-
related components of the physical plant.55 In addition to maintaining workstation 
security,56 a covered entity must establish procedures that govern the movement of 
hardware that contains electronic protected health information within and out of the 
facility in question.57 These procedures should address electronic media disposal, 
removal of protected health information in cases in which equipment will be re-used for 
other purposes, maintenance of records of the hardware’s whereabouts and who is 
responsible for it, and data backup and storage prior to moving equipment.58 
3. Technical Safeguards 
The required and addressable59 technical safeguards detailed by the HIPAA 
Security Rule are designed to ensure that only authorized personnel have access to 
electronic protected health information.60 These safeguards include assigning unique 
user identification names or numbers, establishing emergency access procedures, having 
an automatic logoff after a specific period of inactivity, and implementing encryption and 
decryption mechanisms.61 This provision also discusses audit controls, authentication 
mechanisms for electronic protected health information and for users who want access to 
 
52 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(1), (3), and (4) (2005).  See also 45 C.F.R. § 164.314 (2005) for specifications 
regarding business associate contracts and other arrangements. 
53 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(2) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(ii)(C) (2005). 
54 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(1) (2005). 
55 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(a)(2) (2005). 
56 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(b) and (c) (2005). 
57 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(1) (2005). 
58 45 C.F.R. § 164.310(d)(2) (2005).  The implementation specifications for disposal and media re-use are 
required, while the record-keeping and data backup and storage requirements are addressable. 
59 See footnotes for indications of which safeguards are required and which are addressable. 
60 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(1) (2005). 
61 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(a)(2) (2005).  Unique user identification and emergency access procedures are 
required, while automatic logoff and encryption and decryption are addressable implementation 
specifications. 
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it, and measures to ensure security when electronic protected health information is 
transmitted electronically.62 
B. Enforcement 
The HIPAA legislation authorizes both civil penalties and criminal penalties.63 Since 
DHHS is not authorized to conduct criminal prosecutions, only the civil penalties are 
addressed in the privacy regulations.64 Under a Final Rule issued on February 16, 2006, 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s enforcement provisions are applicable to the Security Rule.65 
Thus, if a covered entity discloses health information in an unauthorized manner for any 
reason, it can be penalized.   In addition, it can be penalized for the absence of 
appropriate security measures even if no PHI is disclosed as a result of the security 
shortcomings.  
The provisions establish a primarily complaint-driven enforcement scheme for 
privacy violations.66 Persons67 who believe that a covered entity is violating the Privacy 
Rule may submit a complaint to the Secretary of HHS,68 who might choose to investigate 
it.69 The authority to administer and enforce the Security Rule has been delegated to the 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), and thus, CMS will investigate 
alleged violations relating to the Security Rule specifically.70 If a covered entity is found 
to be noncompliant, it will be informed by the Secretary,71 who will, if possible, attempt 
to resolve the matter informally.72 The Secretary has authority to impose civil penalties 
for noncompliance in an amount not to exceed one hundred dollars per violation or 
 
62 45 C.F.R. § 164.312(b)-(e) (2005).  Mechanisms for information authentication and integrity controls for 
the transmission of data are designated “addressable.” 
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 and 1320d-6 (2003). The criminal penalty provision is discussed infra note 74. 
64 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.500-160.552 (2000). 
65 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement; Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390 (February 16, 2006) 
(stating that “the final rule amends the existing rules relating to investigation of noncompliance” and the 
imposition of penalties “to make them apply to all of the HIPAA Administrative Simplification rules, rather 
than exclusively to the privacy standards.”  See also 45 C.F.R. § 160.300 (2006) (making the enforcement 
provisions applicable to all HIPAA rules, including the Security Rule).  Originally, the enforcement 
provisions applied only to Subpart E of the Privacy Rule, which limits the circumstances under which 
covered entities can use and disclose protected health information. 
6670 Fed. Reg. 20226 (2005).  The regulations, however, also provide that HHS may conduct compliance 
reviews without receiving a complaint.  Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 160.308 (2005). 
67 A “Person” is defined as a “natural person, trust or estate, partnership, corporation, professional 
association or corporation, or other entity, public or private.”  45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
68 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2005). 
69 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c) (2005). 
70 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegation of 
Authority, 68 Fed. Reg. 60694 (October 23, 2003).  On March 25, 2005, CMS issued a notice entitled 
“Procedures for Non-Privacy Administrative Simplification Complaints Under the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,” which became effective on April 25, 2005.  70 Fed. Reg. 
15329-01.  The notice states that if CMS finds a violation based on a complaint, it will work with the 
covered entity “to obtain voluntary compliance.”  In the absence of cooperation, “the Secretary will pursue 
other options, such as . . .  civil money penalties.”   
71 45 C.F.R. § 160.312(a)(1) (2005). 
72 Id. 
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$25,000 during a calendar year “for all violations of an identical requirement.”73 In 
addition, violators may be subject to criminal prosecution and fined up to $250,000 and 
imprisoned for up to ten years.74 A respondent may request a hearing before an 
administrative law judge (ALJ).75 As is typical in administrative proceedings, only 
limited discovery is permitted,76 and the ALJ is generally not bound by the Federal Rules 
of Evidence.77 
III 
A CRITIQUE OF THE SECURITY RULE 
 
The HIPAA Security Rule is characterized by several flaws and deficiencies that 
greatly detract from its efficacy.  We will analyze each of them in this section. 
A. Covered Entities 
The HIPAA Security Rule, following its enabling legislation, the HIPAA statute, 
covers only health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers who 
transmit health information electronically.78 Consequently, doctors, hospitals, 
pharmacists, health insurers, and HMOs must comply with the HIPAA privacy standards, 
but not all parties possessing PHI are covered.79 Thus, websites selling nonprescription 
medications or dispensing medical advice,80 employers handling applicants’ and 
 
73 45 C.F.R. § 160.508 (2005); 42 U.S.C. 1320d-5 (2003).   A civil penalty may not be imposed for a 
violation if it is punishable as a criminal offense under 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6, which is administered by the 
Department of Justice.  42 U.S.C. 1320d-5(b)(1) (2003); 70 Fed. Reg. 20237.    
74 See  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6: 
Wrongful disclosure of individually identifiable health information 
(a) Offense 
A person who knowingly and in violation of this part –  
(1) uses or causes to be used a unique health identifier; 
(2) obtains individually identifiable health information relating to an individual; or 
(3) discloses individually identifiable health information to another person, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b)   Penalties 
A person described in subsection (a) of this section shall –  
(1) be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both; 
(2) if the offense is committed under false pretenses, be fined not more than $100,000, imprisoned 
not more than 5 years, or both; and  
(3) if the offense is committed with intent to sell, transfer, or use individually identifiable health 
information for commercial advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm, be fined not more than 
$250,000, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.  
75 45 C.F.R. § 160.526(a) (2005). 
76 45 C.F.R. § 160.538 (2005). 
77 45 C.F.R. § 160.558(b) (2005). 
78 45 C.F.R. § 160.102(a) (2005).   
79 SOLOVE, supra note __, at 208; Winn, supra note __, at 618 (affirming that the “Rules do not subject to 
legal sanction any of the numerous entities whose access to personal health information has exploded with 
the increased use of electronic health information”). 
80 See Pew Internet & American Life Project, supra  note __, at 6-8; David L. Baumer et al., Internet 
privacy law:  a comparison between the United States and the European Union, 23 COMPUTERS &
SECURITY 400, 410 (2003) (emphasizing that websites in the U.S. are not regulated with respect to most 
transactions, including those involving health information). 
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employees’ medical records, marketers, or any other business entities that obtain PHI are 
not bound by the requirements of the HIPAA Security Rule.81 The Rule’s narrow scope 
of coverage compromises its ability to protect Americans against misuse of their PHI.  It 
leaves the vast amount of health information that is stored on systems maintained by non-
covered entities especially vulnerable to theft, destruction, or alteration.82 
It is arguable, in fact, that the greatest PHI–related threats are associated with the 
acquisition of PHI by non-health care related entities.  Many commentators have 
expressed concern that disclosure of health information can lead to loss of various types 
of insurance, employment and educational discrimination, denial of loans, and being 
severely disadvantaged in custody battles, adoption efforts, parole proceedings and 
personal injury lawsuits.83 Blackmail, identity theft, and other crimes perpetrated by 
those with access to illicitly obtained PHI are also grave dangers.84 
The European Union has tackled the contemporary threat to privacy very 
aggressively.  The European Union Privacy Directive85 provides wide-ranging privacy 
protection.  It binds “Member States”86 and extends to the processing of all personal data 
by any party, with few exceptions.87 Specifically, the Directive’s broad language 
establishes that “Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade-union 
membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life.”  It then delineates 
exceptions to the rule, which in the case of health information, relate to the provision of 
medical care.88 
By contrast, the U.S. has a much more segmented approach to privacy, though it has 
enacted numerous laws that address privacy issues. The Privacy Act of 1974,89 for 
example, governs all federal agencies.  The law forbids the disclosure of personal 
information (with some exceptions),90 aims to safeguard the security of records,91 and 
establishes a right for individuals to review their records and request corrections of 
errors.92 While the law covers only federal agencies, it is in some ways much broader 
than the HIPAA Privacy Rule because it defines “record” to mean not only medical data, 
 
81 SOLOVE, supra note __, at 208. 
82 FOR THE RECORD, supra note __, at 3. 
83 Joanne L. Hustead & Janlori Goldman, The Genetics Revolution:  Conflicts, Challenges and Conundra,
28 AM. J. L. & MED. 285, 288 (2002); Janet L. Dolgin, Personhood, Discrimination, and the New Genetics, 
66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 755, 764 (2001); Mark A. Rothstein & Sharona Hoffman, Genetic Testing, Genetic 
Medicine, and Managed Care, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 849, 887 (1999). 
84 See supra Introduction. 
85 DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL OF 24 OCTOBER 1995 ON THE 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUALS WITH REGARD TO THE PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA AND ON THE FREE 
MOVEMENT OF SUCH DATA (23.11.1995) [hereinafter EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE] available at 
http://brief.weburb.dk/archive/00000155/. Member states were required to comply with the Directive by 
October 24, 1998. 
86 Id. Article 1, paragraph 1. 
87 Id. Article 3.  The exceptions are detailed in paragraph 2 and include matters such as the processing of 
information for security purposes or criminal law and processing “by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity.” 
88 Id. Article 8, paragraphs 1 & 3. 
89 5 U.S.C. §552a (2000) 
90 5 U.S.C. §552a(b) 
91 5 U.S.C. §552a(e) 
92 5 U.S.C. §552a(c) and (d) (2000). 
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but identifiable information about people’s “education, financial transactions, medical 
history, and criminal or employment history.”93 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s Title V is devoted to privacy.94 It requires financial 
institutions to respect customers’ privacy and shield the security and confidentiality of 
customers’ private information.95 To this end, the law prohibits financial institutions 
from disclosing “nonpublic personal information” to a nonaffiliated third party if the 
disclosure is not authorized by the law96 and requires regulatory agencies to establish 
standards concerning appropriate “administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” for 
private information.97 
A number of other laws also protect privacy in particular realms.  The Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 governs the accessibility and disclosure of 
certain student records.98 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 mandates that 
cable operators inform subscribers of any personal information that is collected, the 
disclosure of such information, and the subscribers’ right of access to the information.99 
Information cannot be collected or disclosed without the customer’s written or electronic 
consent unless it is needed for a “legitimate business activity.”100 The Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act101 governs electronic surveillance and restricts searches and 
interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications.102 The Video Privacy 
Protection Act of 1988103 provides that video store operators may not disclose the titles of 
the videos rented or purchased by any particular customer, though some exceptions 
apply.104 The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994105 requires states to obtain a 
driver’s consent before divulging personal information contained in motor vehicle 
records to marketers unless one of the stated exceptions is applicable.106 The Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998107 establishes that operators of websites targeted at 
children must acquire parental consent in order to use the personal data of children under 
thirteen.108 
The laws discussed above provide varying degrees of privacy protection to 
individuals with respect to particular kinds of information or particular holders of private 
information.109 It is unlikely that the U.S. will be willing to adopt a privacy law that is as 
 
93 5 U.S.C. §552a(4) (2000). 
94 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6827 (2000). 
95 15 U.S.C. §6801(a) (2000). 
96 15 U.S.C. §6802(a) and (b) (2000). 
97 15 U.S.C. §6801(b) (2000). 
98 20 U.S.C. §1232g (2000). 
99 47 U.S.C. § 551(a), (b), (c), and (d) (2000). 
100 47 U.S.C. § 551 (b) and (c) (2000).  The law further provides that cable operators may not disclose to 
the government  “records revealing cable subscriber selection of video programming from a cable operator” 
and must destroy personally identifiable information when it is no longer needed.  47 U.S.C. § 551 
(c)(2)(D) and (e) (2000). 
101 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; 2701-09 (2000). 
102 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2701 (2000) 
103 18 U.S.C. §§2710-11 (2000) 
104 18 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (3) and (b)(1) (2000). 
105 18 U.S.C. §§ 2721-2725 (2000) 
106 18 U.S.C. §2721 (2000) 
107 15 U.S.C.  §§6501-06 (Supp. 2005). 
108 15 U.S.C.  §§6501(1), 6502 (Supp. 2005). 
109 For a critique of the privacy laws see SOLOVE, supra note __, at 67-72. 
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far-reaching as the European Union Privacy Directive.  However, in the spirit of already 
existing U.S. legislation, we should at the very least have a law that narrowly targets only 
health information but is broad enough to include within its scope all parties that maintain 
or transmit such information in electronic form for business reasons related to the 
substance of the PHI.   
This approach has already been suggested in a bipartisan bill introduced by Senators 
Hillary Clinton and Bill Frist, entitled the Health Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 
2005.110 The bill was designed “[t]o reduce healthcare costs, improve efficiency, and 
improve healthcare quality through the development of a nationwide interoperable health 
information technology system.”111 The bill provided that the HIPAA privacy 
regulations be amended to “apply to any health information stored or transmitted in an 
electronic format.”112 In our recommendation section, Part IV, we will similarly 
recommend that the term “covered entities” in the HIPAA Privacy Rule be expanded to 
include any person who stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for 
any business purpose related to the substance of the PHI. 
B. PHI Accessibility 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule allows patients access to their PHI.113 Specifically, the 
regulations provide that “an individual has a right of access to inspect and obtain a copy 
of protected health information about the individual in a designated record set,”114 with 
some exceptions, such as psychotherapy notes and information compiled for purposes of 
litigation or administrative proceedings.115 Furthermore, the Privacy Rule enables 
individuals to request amendment of PHI that is incorrect.116 
If the definition of “covered entity” is expanded to include any person who 
knowingly stores or transmits individually identifiable electronic PHI for any business 
purpose related to the substance of the PHI,117 the right of access to inspect and obtain a 
copy of PHI should extend to all electronic PHI that is processed by any covered entity.  
In addition, the right to correct PHI should be similarly extended.  Thus, if an employer118 
or a bank obtains PHI in order to make employment or loan decisions, the individual who 
is the subject of that information should have a right of access to that data and a right to 
amend it if it is incorrect.  
Furthermore, the right of access should be expanded to include a right to establish the 
provenance of the data and the purpose for which it is used.  This approach has been 
utilized by the Fair Credit Reporting Act,119 which requires all consumer reporting 
 
110 109th Congress, 1st Session, S. 1262 (Frist-Clinton), available at 
http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/s1262.pdf. See also Terry, supra note __.   
111 Id. 
112 Id. Sec. 2907. 
113 45 C.F.R. §164.524 (2005). 
114 45 C.F.R. §164.524 (a)(1) (2005). 
115 45 C.F.R. §164.524 (a)-(b) (2005). 
116 45 C.F.R. § 164.526 (a) (2005).  The provision also specifies the conditions under which an amendment 
request can be denied. 
117 See supra Part III.A. 
118 See Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000), for details concerning the obligations 
of employers with respect to medical information. 
119 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681u (2000). 
15
agencies to disclose to consumers, upon request, not only the information in the 
consumer’s file,120 but also “the sources of the information.”121 In the case of health care 
providers, health plans, and many health care clearinghouses, the origins and purposes of 
the data will be obvious from the documents themselves, and thus, this requirement will 
add no burden to the covered entity.  However, in the case of other parties, establishing 
the provenance and uses of the information could be essential to determining whether the 
Security Rule has been breached by any covered entity, allowing the inappropriate 
dissemination of PHI.  Information concerning the data’s origins will also be necessary in 
order to ascertain whether criminal prosecution should be pursued, how widely the 
information has been distributed, and how much harm might be done to the individual at 
issue.   
As discussed above, PHI is already commonly targeted by hackers.122 It is not 
unrealistic to expect that a black market will develop for PHI to which businesses, 
marketers, blackmailers, and others could turn in order to purchase health information.  
According to one source, about ten billion dollars in U.S. medical transcription business 
is outsourced to foreign countries.123 Foreign data processors of PHI are “business 
associates”124 of covered entities, and are bound by certain privacy protection 
requirements under the HIPAA regulations.125 However, DHHS has admitted that it is 
unable to effectively regulate offshore business associates or monitor their contracts with 
U.S. companies.126 It is entirely possible that businesses or individuals processing PHI in 
distant locations, far from the direct reach of U.S. regulatory powers, will begin selling 
PHI to third parties who believe it offers opportunities for profit. 
Several databases already sell lists of persons suffering from a large number of 
ailments.127 These sources include the Medical Marketing Service128 and Hippo Direct 
Medical Maladies Direct Marketing Lists.129 In addition, health care information 
companies sell individual physicians’ prescribing records to pharmaceutical companies 
that use them to market particular drugs to specific doctors.130 These lists are not 
necessarily compiled by illegal means.  Rather, medical and other personal data can often 
be mined from purchase information, supermarket savings cards, surveys, sweepstakes 
and contest entries, U.S. Census records, credit card transactions, phone records, credit 
records, product warranty cards, or public records that are rightfully in the possession of 
 
120 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1) (2000). 
121 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(2) (2000). 
122 See supra Introduction. 
123 Terry, Supra note __, at __. 
124 45 C.F.R. § 103 (defining “business associates”) 
125 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e) (establishing standards for “business associate contracts”).  The provision 
mandates that, with some exceptions, contracts between a covered entity and a business associate “may not 
authorize the business associate to use or further disclose the information in a manner that would violate the 
requirements of this subpart, if done by the covered entity.” 
126 Terry, supra note __, at __, citing Letter from Secretary Thompson to Congressman Markey, June 14, 
2004, at pg. 2, http://www.house.gov/markey/Issues/iss_health_resp040614.pdf. (no longer available on 
the website). 
127 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy and Consumer Profiling, available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling
128 http://www.mmslists.com/ 
129 http://www.hippodirect.com/ListSubjectsN_1.asp?lSubject=37 
130 Steinbrook, supra note 14, at 2745. 
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those aggregating the information.131 In addition, some sources sell information to 
interested buyers and are not currently prohibited from doing so by law.  Thus, health 
care information companies purchase prescription data directly from pharmacies and, in 
turn, sell it to drug companies.132 Consequently, individuals are vulnerable to 
manipulation, exploitation, and discrimination by those who have access to their PHI.  
The patients, in turn, should, at the very least, be empowered to learn the origins and uses 
of PHI that falls into the hands of various parties.  
This disclosure approach is consistent with the one adopted by the European Union 
Privacy Directive.  The Directive provides that each data subject may obtain 
“confirmation as to whether or not data relating to him are being processed and 
information at least as to the purposes of the processing,” as well as the recipients, 
contents, and source of the data.133 The approach is also consistent with the Fair 
Information Practices (FIP) outlined in a report issued in 1973 by the U.S. Department of 
Housing, Education, and Welfare.134 The FIP provide, in relevant part: 
 
• There must be a way for an individual to find out what information about him is 
in a record and how it is used. 
• There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about him that was 
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes 
without his consent. 
  
• Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of 
identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended 
use and must take precautions to prevent misuse of the data.135 
Under these principles, data subjects have a right to know how their PHI is used.  
They should also have a right to know the source of the information possessed by any 
party so that they can ensure that their information is not being misused or utilized for 
purposes for which it was not intended.  In Part IV.B we will discuss mechanisms for 
allowing meaningful inquiry concerning the origins and uses of electronically-stored PHI.      
C. Insufficient Compliance Guidelines 
The Security Rule leaves the mechanisms of implementing the outlined security 
standards to the discretion of the covered entity.136 While flexibility is often a desirable 
 
131 Electronic Privacy Information Center, supra note __, at 1. 
132 Steinbrook, supra note __, at 2745. 
133 EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE, supra note __, at Article 12(a) 
134 Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, 
Computers and the Rights of Citizens (July 1973), available at 
http://aspe.os.dhhs.gov/datacncl/1973privacy/tocprefacemembers.htm
135 Id.  The Fair Information Principles have not been codified into any specific law in the United States, 
but rather, have served as the basis for some of the privacy laws discussed in this article.  See Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse, A Review of the Fair Information Principles:  The Foundation of Privacy Public 
Policy (2004), available at www.privacyrights.org/ar/fairinfo.htm.   
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quality, it can also be hazardous in the regulatory context, because it can leave those 
subject to regulation without sufficient guidance as to how to comply with legal 
requirements.137 In this case, it is unrealistic to expect that every health care provider 
will have the technical expertise and ability to determine on its own how to implement 
the security standards.  Furthermore, some organizations could use the regulations’ 
vagueness as a justification for establishing minimal PHI security measures.  According 
to several sources, information technology appears to be a low priority for the health care 
industry.  As of 2002, only two to three percent of funding was devoted to the electronic 
management of PHI, compared to ten to fifteen percent of funding devoted by other 
industries to advance information technology.138 Furthermore, the health care industry is 
“generally considered to be 10 to 15 years behind other industries with regard to 
security.”139 
A careful reading of just a few of the Security Rule’s provisions will illustrate its 
characteristic weaknesses.  In a provision entitled “Flexibility of Approach,” the Rule 
states:  “Covered entities may use any security measures that allow the covered entity to 
reasonably and appropriately implement the standards and implementation 
specifications.”140 The regulations elaborate on the “reasonably and appropriately” 
standard only by instructing covered entities to take into account the entity’s size, 
complexity, capabilities, and technical infrastructure; the security measures’ costs; and 
the “probability and criticality of potential risks to electronic protected health 
information.”141 
The above language does not explain the term “criticality” and fails to provide 
guidance concerning how to identify “potential risks.”  Likewise, in its “Administrative 
Safeguards” section, the Security Rule requires covered entities to “[c]onduct an accurate 
and thorough assessment of the potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of electronic protected health information.”142 No further details 
are provided concerning how the complex task of risk analysis is to be accomplished. 
In response to comments received during the proposed Rule’s public comment period, 
HHS explained that 
 
A thorough and accurate risk analysis would consider “all relevant losses” that would 
be expected if the security measures were not in place.  “Relevant losses” would 
include losses caused by unauthorized uses and disclosures and loss of data integrity 
that would be expected to occur absent the security measures.143 
136 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (b) (2005). 
137 Choi et al., supra note __, at 62 (characterizing the HIPAA Privacy Regulations as a “loosely-worded 
document that is the current passing standard for privacy” and predicting that covered entities will 
experience difficulty “interpreting exactly what HIPAA security standards mean to their company and what 
exactly constitutes compliance.”). 
138 Id. 
139 Nancy A. Lawson et al., The HIPAA Privacy Rule:  An Overview of Compliance Initiatives and 
Requirements, 70 DEF. COUNS. J. 127 (2003). 
140 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1) (2005). 
141 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(2) (2005). 
142 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) (2005). 
143 Department of Health and Human Services Office of the Secretary, Health Insurance Reform:  Security 
Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8347 (2003). 
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However, this description also lacks sufficient specificity.  For example, whose losses 
are to be considered – those suffered by the data subjects, by covered entities,144 by 
business associates, or by other stakeholders?  How direct or remote should the potential 
risks be in order to be considered?  Unauthorized disclosure of PHI to various parities can 
affect insurance coverage, job prospects, family dynamics, and even social 
opportunities.145 Should all of these potential consequences be contemplated? 
If covered entities are to maintain discretion under the Security Rule’s flexible 
approach,146 the key to ensuring that they choose effective security measures is a 
requirement that they implement rigorous risk analysis and management processes.  
These processes should identify, analyze, and mitigate the particular risks associated with 
health information disclosure for various stakeholders, and especially for data subjects.  
The Security Rule fails to provide sufficient guidance for the development of such 
measures. 
Besides exhibiting a low level of specificity in its security standards, the Security 
Rule fails to address certain important issues.  The Security Rule omits an explicit 
requirement that covered entities, perhaps with the assistance of consultants or 
vendors,147 identify the relevant best current security practices of the health informatics 
and computer security communities.  Such a requirement is needed to ensure that covered 
entities are knowledgeable about sound security practices and emergent security risks and 
their countermeasures.   The rapid exploitation of newly discovered vulnerabilities in 
software systems and applications by attackers makes it essential that covered entities be 
extremely diligent in learning about and responding to them.  Covered entities or their 
agents should utilize the substantial amount of relevant information that is provided by 
reputable organizations such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), 
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), the National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP), and 
software vendors.148 
Another crucial omission from the Security Rule is guidance concerning the risks 
inherent in the development, operation, and maintenance of the computer software that 
provides the functionality of systems that process electronic PHI.  Such software is often 
extremely complex, comprising many thousands or millions of program instructions, 
most of which are executed only under particular conditions.  Errors in software 
development are virtually inevitable.  Any software defect, such as a missing or 
erroneous sequence of instructions, becomes a security vulnerability if an attacker can 
exploit it to his or her benefit and to the detriment of system stakeholders.  Moreover, 
mistakes in the configuration and operation of software can easily render it insecure,149 as 
 
144 In a response to comments to the proposed Security Rule, HHS emphasized the potential losses that 
could be suffered by a covered entity:  “A covered entity that lacks adequate protections risks inadvertent 
disclosure of patient data, with resulting loss of public trust, and potential legal action.” 
145 See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. 
146 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(b)(1) (2005). 
147 See infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the services of security product vendors). 
148 See infra Parts IV.C.2. and IV.C.3. 
149 The Top 20 Most Critical Internet Security Vulnerabilities (Updated) - The Experts Consensus, available 
at http://www.sans.org/top20/ (July 2006). 
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can errors made during software maintenance,150 the process of modifying software to 
correct defects or to enhance its functionality.  Thus, covered entities should be required 
to consider the risks associated with software as part of their risk analysis process and to 
follow best current practices for software development, validation, operation, and 
maintenance.  These risks include, among others: incorrect functionality resulting in 
erroneous output, missing functionality, poor “usability,” poor documentation, “crashes” 
and other critical failures, and excessive costs and delays in development leading to 
reduced emphasis on product quality and security.151 All of these risks can adversely 
affect the security of electronic private health information. 
If compliance with the Security Rule’s standards is not to be a sham, the Rule’s 
standards and implementation specifications must be augmented, and covered entities 
must receive further guidance as to how to achieve their obligations.  Part IV.C will 
develop recommendations for elucidating the Security Rule’s requirements and 
facilitating compliance through instruments that limit its cost and burdensomeness. 
D. Private Cause of Action 
The HIPAA Security Rule does not provide for a private cause of action.152 Rather, 
enforcement is achieved through administrative procedures and hearings before an 
ALJ.153 It is noteworthy that under the Clinton administration, the DHHS Secretary’s 
recommendations to Congress included a proposal for a private right of action, but this 
approach was ultimately rejected.154 
Under the enforcement system established by the regulations, any aggrieved 
individual has a right to file a complaint with the DHHS Secretary.155 At his discretion, 
the Secretary may investigate the complaint.156 If a violation is found, the Secretary is to 
impose a penalty on the offender157 and collect the money,158 and no damages are 
available for persons who are aggrieved or injured by the privacy lapse.  At the request of 
the covered entity, a hearing may be held before an ALJ, but the only parties to 
participate in the hearing process are the respondent and DHHS personnel.159 
150 STEPHEN R. SCHACH, OBJECT ORIENTED AND CLASSICAL SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 7-12, 479-495 (6th 
edition, McGraw-Hill, 2005).  
151 Peter G. Neumann, Illustrative Risks to the Public in the Use of Computer Systems and Related 
Technology, available at  ftp://ftp.csl.sri.com/pub/users/neumann/illustrative.pdf; SCHACH, supra note 150. 
152 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300 – 160.552; Winn, supra note __, at 618. 
153 Id. 
154 Secretary of Health and Human Services; Recommendations, confidentiality of Individually-identifiable 
Health Information, pursuant to section 264 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (Sept. 11, 1997), at 2, available at 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/medical/hhs_recommendations_1997.html (“Any individual whose rights 
under the law have been violated, whether negligently or knowingly, should be permitted to bring an action 
for actual damages and equitable relief.  For knowing violation attorney’s fees and punitive damages 
should be available.”). 
155 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(c) (2005).  See http:// www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa for information concerning the filing 
of complaints and other matters. 
156 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2005). 
157 45 C.F.R. § 160.402(a) (2005). 
158 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2005). 
159 45 C.F.R. § 160.504(a) (2005). 
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By contrast to the HIPAA Privacy Rule, many of the other American privacy laws 
establish a private cause of action.  These include the Privacy Act of 1974,160 the Cable 
Communications Policy Act,161 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,162 the Video 
Privacy Protection Act of 1988,163 and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994.164 
The laws provide explicitly for a right to recover attorneys’ fees and costs so that even 
plaintiffs with minimal damages resulting from inappropriate disclosure are likely to find 
attorneys who are willing to litigate their cases.  Like the above-listed laws, the European 
Union Privacy Directive supports the notion of private litigation and mandates that 
“Member States shall provide for the right of every person to a judicial remedy for any 
breach of the rights” embodied by the state’s applicable privacy law.165 
We recommend that the HIPAA Security Rule’s enforcement provisions, which apply 
to the entirety of the HIPAA privacy regulations,166 be revised to include a private cause 
of action.  Further details concerning suggested procedures and remedies will be 
discussed in Part IV.D below.  At this point, however, since covered entities would surely 
protest against the prospect of costly and onerous private litigation, it is appropriate to 
justify our recommendation and analyze the contributions a private cause of action could 
make to the enforcement of electronic PHI security. 
If the HIPAA privacy regulations are intended to protect data subjects, they must 
provide access to a remedy when individuals’ rights are violated and must not leave 
victims out of the enforcement process.   The HIPAA regulations provide little 
satisfaction for aggrieved persons and discount their potential injuries by failing to 
include them in enforcement proceedings and by providing them with no personal 
remedy.   
Moreover, private litigation is often needed as an adjunct to administrative procedures 
for deterrence purposes.  Aggressive pursuit of governmental enforcement actions may be 
dependent upon political priorities and pressures, such as the degree to which a case is 
perceived as advancing the general public interest167 or budgetary and other resource 
 
160 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (2000) (stating that individuals may bring civil actions against noncompliant 
agencies for injunctive relief or for damages up to $1000 in cases of intentional or willful violations as well 
as attorneys’ fees and costs). 
161 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(1) (providing that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation 
of this section may bring a civil action” in a U.S. district court for actual damages, punitive damages, 
attorneys’ fees and costs).   
162 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2000) (stating that “any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from 
the person or entity which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate,” including actual 
damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees and costs).   
163 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (allowing aggrieved persons to bring civil actions for actual damages, punitive 
damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and equitable relief). 
164 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (establishing that a “person who knowingly obtains, discloses or uses personal 
information from a motor vehicle record” for an impermissible purpose will be liable to the individual at 
issue for actual damages, punitive damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, and equitable relief. 
165 EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE, Article 22. 
166 71 Fed. Reg. 8390 (Feb. 16, 2006) (stating that the regulation’s enforcement provisions now apply “to 
all of the HIPAA Administrative Simplification rules”). 
167 See Arthur Best, Monetary Damages for False Advertising, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 40 (1987) (explaining 
that “[p]rivate suits do not have to pass a public interest test”). 
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allocation constraints.168 Thus, clear violations that affect only a single person could be 
ignored, and cases that would not set important precedents might not be litigated by the 
government no matter how justified prosecution would be.  Such inevitable resource 
rationing decisions can leave a significant deterrence void, which can only be filled 
through private enforcement.   
Private litigation features several important advantages.  It can not only effectively 
restrict unlawful conduct through the threat of costly and well-publicized court 
proceedings, but also can often resolve cases more quickly than administrative 
enforcement handled by overburdened agencies.169 Furthermore, careful judicial review 
that produces published opinions can serve an important rulemaking function by setting 
precedents that interpret vague language in administrative regulations.170 While HIPAA 
mandates that ALJs must issue decisions containing findings of fact and conclusions of 
law,171 the decisions are to be issued only to the parties and are unlikely to be published 
in any widely accessible format.172 Cases that capture media attention, as some lawsuits 
do, have the added advantage of educating members of the public at large concerning 
their rights and obligations under the law.173 
DHHS has, in fact already been criticized for grossly deficient enforcement of the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule.174 Between April 14, 2003 and June of 2006, DHHS received  
19,420 complaints concerning violations of privacy.175 However, no civil fine has been 
imposed,176 and only two criminal actions have been brought under HIPAA’s criminal 
enforcement provision.177 One case prosecuted a hospital phlebotomist who accessed the 
medical records of a terminal cancer patient in Seattle and obtained credit cards in his 
name,178 and the other resulted in the conviction of a Texas woman who sold the medical 
records of an FBI agent.179 
One might argue that several causes of action relating to privacy violations already 
exist in tort law, rendering a statutory private cause of action under HIPAA unnecessary.  
The tort of public disclosure of private facts consists of four elements:  (a) public 
 
168 See Ann J. Gellis, Mandatory Disclosure for Municipal Securities:  Issues in Implementation, 13 J. 
CORP. L. 65, 86 (1987) (stating that “reliance on public proceedings as the prime means of enforcement is 
subject to the direct political restraints of budget resources and indirect political pressures regarding how 
those resources are directed.”).   
169 Best, supra note __, at 40. 
170 See Gellis, supra note __, at 81 (discussing judicial rulemaking functions). 
171 45 C.F.R. § 160.546 (a). 
172 45 C.F.R. § 160.546 (c).   
173 If the Secretary imposes a fine on a covered entity, the Secretary is to notify the public “in such manner 
as the Secretary deems appropriate.”  45 C.F.R. § 160.426.  However, the Secretary is given no instructions 
as to which media outlets to utilize, and it is uncertain whether a mere statement concerning the imposition 
of a penalty will generate the kind of extensive media interest that courtroom drama seems to produce. 
174 See Peter P. Swire, Justice Department Opinion Undermines Protection of Medical Privacy, Center for 
American Progress, June 7, 2005, 
http://www.americanprogress.org/site/pp.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=743281&printmode=1.
175 Rob Stein, Medical Privacy Law Nets No Fines. WASH. POST, June 5, 2006, at A01.  April 14, 2003 was 
the date upon which the regulations went into effect.  45 C.F.R. § 164.534. 
176 Id.
177 Id.  The criminal enforcement provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2000). 
178 Swire, supra note __.  The defendant had charged over $9000 on the credit card largely for video game 
purchases.  He pled guilty and was sentenced to 16 months in prison.  
179 Stein, supra note __. 
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disclosure; (b) of a private fact; (c) that would be objectionable and offensive to a 
reasonable person; and (d) that is not of legitimate public concern.180 Most courts, 
however, have found that in order to support this theory of liability, plaintiffs must 
prove widespread dissemination of personal information to the public181 and have 
deemed this tort theory to fit mostly cases involving publication through the media.182 
In the context of HIPAA violations, however, PHI will generally be delivered to 
particular interested parties, such as drug representatives, employers, or individuals with 
criminal intent, rather than to the general public, and thus, the tort of public disclosure 
of private facts will be inapplicable. 
A more fruitful tort theory for plaintiffs might be breach of confidentiality.183 Courts 
have based the patient’s right of confidentiality upon a variety of sources, including 
privilege statutes protecting physician-patient communications, licensing statutes 
prohibiting the disclosure of patient information without authorization, and medical 
ethics principles articulated in the Hippocratic Oath and other sources.184 In Horne v. 
Patton,185 for example, the court found that a physician breached his duty of 
confidentiality by disclosing medical information to the patient’s employer.  The court 
ruled that a doctor has a duty not to disclose patient information obtained in the course of 
treatment and that a private cause of action exists in cases where the duty is breached.186 
An action for breach of confidentiality can be maintained regardless of the degree to 
which the information has been publicly distributed or of its offensiveness, and there is 
no requirement to prove the intent of the perpetrator.187 
Nevertheless, in general, the tort of breach of confidentiality can be established only 
when the perpetrator and the victim of the breach of confidentiality had a direct 
 
180 See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal.App.3d 118, 126 (1983) (Jury found defendant liable for 
publicizing fact that plaintiff had gender corrective surgery. Award was overturned based on erroneous 
jury instructions). There are three other kinds of invasion of privacy torts, none of which are likely to be 
relevant in the case of PHI disclosures—intrusion on seclusion, appropriation of name/likeness, and 
placing someone in a false light. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
181 Winn, supra note __, at 653.  See Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 617 F. Supp. 1359, 
1369 (S.C. 1985) (stating that “[c]ommunication to a single individual or to a small group of people” will 
not support liability under a theory of public disclosure of private facts, which requires publicity rather than 
publication to a small group of people); Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F.Supp. 128, 132 (E. D. Tenn. 1981) 
(emphasizing that publication to a small number of people will not create liability); Tollefson v. Price, 430 
P.2d 990 (Ore. 1967) (stating that public disclosure occurs only when the information is communicated to 
the public generally or to a large number of people); Vogel v. W. T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 
1974) (explaining that the tort is established only if disclosure is made to the public at large or the 
information is certain to become public knowledge); Swinton Creek Nursery v. Edisto Farm Credit, 514 
S.E.2d 126, 131 (S.C. 1999) (stating that “publicity, as opposed to mere publication, is what is required to 
give rise to a cause of action for this branch of invasion of privacy”). 
182 SOLOVE, supra note __, at 60 (explaining that this tort “appears to be designed to redress excesses of the 
press”). 
183 See Winn, supra note __, at 652-58 (discussing the common law tort theory of breach of 
confidentiality and its implications). 
184 Id. at 654-55. 
185 287 So.2d 824 (Ala. 1973). 
186 Id. at 829-30. 
187 Winn, supra note __, at 657-58 (comparing the torts of invasion of privacy and breach of 
confidentiality). 
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relationship.188 Plaintiffs have also occasionally prevailed against third parties who 
knowingly induced physicians to reveal confidential information in violation of 
physician-patient confidentiality responsibilities, but here too the improper disclosure is 
made by the doctor.189 
The breach of confidentiality tort, therefore, will not extend to cases in which insurers 
or clearinghouses, rather than physicians or hospitals, legitimately possess PHI and 
disclose it to third parties who are not entitled to the data.  Similarly, if the definition of 
“covered entities” is extended to encompass a large variety of parties in possession of 
PHI, the breach of confidentiality tort will not apply to disclosures made by employers, 
data miners, and others who obtained PHI by means other than physician inducement.  
Consequently, a statutory cause of action is needed to capture the many privacy threats 
that do not fit within the narrow bounds of common law causes of action.  In addition, 
because breach of confidentiality is a common law tort, the standard for establishing 
liability can vary from state to state.190 A federal statutory cause of action with explicit 
guidelines regarding damages will diminish inequities and inconsistencies in case 
outcomes. 
IV 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this section we provide four primary recommendations to enhance the efficacy of 
the Security Rule.  These include:  1) expanding the scope of the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
through revision of the definitions of “covered entity” and “health information”; 2) 
enabling individuals to receive information concerning the origins and uses of their PHI; 
3) bolstering existing standards and implementation specifications and providing covered 
entities with guidance and mechanisms that will facilitate compliance with the Security 
Rule’s requirements; and 4) establishing a private cause of action for aggrieved 
individuals.  Our recommendations are designed to create fixed regulations that are 
workable in the dynamic and ever-changing realms of computer technology and security 
vulnerabilities.  They also seek to balance patients’ need for privacy protection against 
business’ need to operate efficiently and profitably.  We have carefully crafted our 
definitions to avoid creating unrealistic burdens for those who cannot bear them.  We 
 
188 Id. at 662; Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 530 (Or. 1985 ( finding that a mother who 
had given her daughter up for adoption had a cause of action for breach of confidentiality against a doctor 
who helped her daughter discover her mother’s identity and explaining that “only one who holds the 
information in confidence can be charged with a breach of confidence.”). 
189 Winn, supra note __, at 661-665.  See Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 243 F.Supp. 793 
(N.D. Ohio 1965) (suit brought against a physician’s malpractice insurer that had induced the physician to 
disclose the patient’s confidential medical records when no malpractice case was pending); Alberts v. 
Devine, 479 N.E.2d 113 (Mass. 1985) (suit brought against individuals who obtained information from the 
plaintiff’s psychiatrist and used it to make an adverse employment decision); Morris v. Consolidation Coal 
Co., 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994) (involving an employer who inappropriately obtained information from 
a physician who treated the plaintiff for injuries for which he claimed workmen’s compensation); Biddle v. 
Warren General Hospital, 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999) (involving a law firm that induced a hospital to 
allow it to review all patient files in order to determine whether the patients were eligible for Supplemental 
Security Insurance Disability benefits, and thus, presumably, might wish to utilize the law firm’s services). 
190 See cases listed supra note 189. 
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have also considered the implications of our proposals in a variety of circumstances, 
which we will illustrate through detailed examples.   
A. Expanding the Regulatory Scope 
 1. Covered Entities  
Because health care providers, insurers and clearinghouses are by no means the only 
entities to maintain and transmit PHI, it is illogical to limit the jurisdiction of the Security 
Rule in particular and the privacy regulations in general to these three types of entities.191 
The threat to electronic PHI reaches far beyond the health care field, since a variety of 
parties, such as marketers, blackmailers, and anyone with a stake in an individual’s 
financial future, might be interested in obtaining health information.192 
Consequently, the term “covered entity” in the HIPAA Privacy Rule193 should be 
expanded to include a fourth component that reads:  “any person who knowingly stores or 
transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any business 
purpose related to the substance of such information.”  At the same time, some of the 
Privacy Rule’s “Applicability” sections194 and the “Applicability” provision of the 
HIPAA legislation itself195 would need to be revised to add the above-described fourth 
covered category. 
The term “Person” is defined in the privacy regulations as “a natural person, trust or 
estate, partnership, corporation, professional association or corporation, or other entity, 
public or private.”196 The term “business” should be defined as an “activity or enterprise 
undertaken for purposes of livelihood or profit.”197 
Admittedly, limiting the scope of regulatory coverage to those who utilize PHI for 
business purposes related to the substance of the PHI will result in the persistence of 
some significant security threats.  For example, volunteers associated with religious 
organizations might collect and electronically store large volumes of information about 
community members who have been hospitalized or have disabilities for purposes of 
providing them with assistance.  If this data is not secured through adequate computer 
technology and security practices, it could be inadvertently or deliberately disseminated 
to unwanted sources, and yet, this volunteer activity could not be defined as “business” 
under the proposed revision and would not be addressed by the Privacy Rule.   
Nevertheless, it is inadvisable to extend the regulations beyond the suggested revision 
because doing so, ironically, could result in increased governmental invasion of privacy 
rather than enhanced privacy protection.  To illustrate, a definition of “covered entity” 
that included any person who handled electronic PHI for any reason whatsoever would 
capture private citizens who e-mailed each other about a friend’s medical problem.  
These individuals would be required to purchase costly security technology for their 
computers and would be subject to penalties for disseminating news of the illness to third 
 
191 See supra Part III.A. 
192 Id. 
193 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) for current definition. 
194 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.102, 164.104 (2005). 
195 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(a) (2000). 
196 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) 
197 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911). 
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parties without the data subject’s consent.  Such a rule would constitute unwarranted 
government intervention in purely private matters.  In the case of the volunteers discussed 
above, application of the privacy regulations to volunteer activities would also be 
undesirable because the cost of compliance and the threat of liability might deter 
engagement in charitable work and, therefore, hurt rather than promote the interests of 
those who are sick or have disabilities.  It should also be recalled that several relevant 
causes of action exist under tort theories, such as public disclosure of private facts and 
breach of confidentiality.198 Thus, disclosure of private health information by parties that 
are not covered by the Privacy Rule’s revised definition could, in appropriate 
circumstances, be addressed through tort law, if they cause injury to the data subject. 
Furthermore, limiting covered entities to those that knowingly process individually 
identifiable health information in electronic form for any business purpose related to the 
substance of such information addresses the fact that some parties might unintentionally 
and inadvertently come to possess health information.  For example, a photo shop that 
develops pictures from digital cameras could handle pictures revealing scars and physical 
impairments, or memorializing hospitalizations, births, and other health-related events.  
These might be stored for a time on the business’ computer even though no employee 
specifically knows of their existence or uses them for any purpose relating to health and 
medicine.  It would be excessive and impolitic to burden all photo shops with the 
requirements of the Security Rule and other privacy regulations based on the possibility 
that some of the pictures they develop will contain medical data.  
The final qualification of the definition, which restricts covered entities to those that 
process PHI for any business purpose related to the substance of such information aims 
to exclude those who might come to handle some form of PHI in the course of their 
business but who do not actually use the contents of the information.  Thus, the photo 
shop described above would be excluded from coverage not only for the reasons already 
discussed, but also because it does not utilize the contents of health information 
concerning individuals for any business purpose.   
To illustrate further, a small “mom and pop” store might sell over-the-counter 
medications along with food and other items.  If a customer pays by credit card, these 
drugs might be scanned for payment purposes and associated with the customer’s credit 
card number in electronic transaction records.  The store operators, however, would 
retain the information only for purposes of credit card records and would not utilize 
specific information concerning the customer’s health-related purchases for any business 
purpose.199 It would be inappropriate to require the mom and pop store to comply with 
the HIPAA privacy regulations’ requirements based solely on its sale of pain relief or 
cold medications.   
By contrast, pharmacies selling prescription drugs that are labeled with the patient’s 
name and doctor’s instructions have far more extensive information about patients, 
including the names of their doctors, histories of their prescription drug purchases over 
time, and other details, which they utilize for purposes of refills and identifying repeat 
customers who fill new prescriptions.  Drug stores are thus justifiably covered entities.200 
198 See supra notes 180-189 and accompanying text. 
199 If, however, the store operators wished to sell individually identifiable information about the purchase of 
health products to third parties and thereby profit from its processing, they would become covered entities. 
200 SOLOVE, supra note __, at 208. 
26
Under the proposed definition, most if not all “business associates” will also become 
covered entities by virtue of being hired specifically to process PHI.201 This coverage is 
consistent with the existing regulations, which state that a “covered entity may be a 
business associate of another covered entity”202 and will provide reinforced protection to 
data subjects.  Business associates will not only be bound by the terms of their contracts 
with other covered entities, which are governed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule,203 but will 
also themselves be subject to all of the Privacy Rule’s provisions, to HHS investigations 
and administrative enforcement actions,204 and to private litigation in case of statutory 
violations.   
 2. Health Information 
 The recommended change to the definition of “covered entity” will necessitate an  
expansion of the meaning of  “health information,” which is found in the privacy 
regulations’ definition section205 as well as in HIPAA’s statutory definition section.206 
“Health information” currently means:  
 
any information, whether oral or recorded in any form or medium, that –  
(A) is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public health 
authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care clearinghouse; 
and  
 
(B) relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of health care to an individual. 
 
This definition excludes PHI that is provided by individuals without the involvement of a 
health professional and is handled by financial institutions, marketers, website operators, 
and many other parties with an interest in individuals’ electronic PHI.  An expansion of 
the concept of “covered entities” will necessitate a parallel expansion in the meaning of 
“health information.”  An appropriate definition can be derived from the proposed Health 
Technology to Enhance Quality Act of 2005,207 discussed previously.208 The bill defines 
“health information” to mean “any information, recorded in any form or medium, that 
relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
 
201 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) for definition of “business associate.”  See also 45 C.F.R. § 
160.504(e)(1) (2005) for contractual requirements relating to the processing of PHI by business associates.  
Under the contractual terms demanded by this provision, it would be very difficult for a business associate 
to claim that it did not know it was processing PHI and thus to escape HIPAA responsibilities.  To avoid 
any ambiguity, however, covered entities should explicitly state in their contracts that they are hiring 
covered entities to process PHI. 
202 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005) (explained under the definition of business associate provision (1)(ii)(3)). 
203 45 C.F.R. § 160.504(e)(1) (2005) (articulating the standard for business associate contracts). 
204 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.500-160.552 (2005).  Unfortunately, business associates in foreign countries are 
likely to be beyond the reach of HHS enforcement. 
205 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2005). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 1320d(4) (2000). 
207 S. 1262, supra note __.   
208 See supra notes 110-112 and accompanying text. 
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individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual.”209 This language does not limit 
“health information” based on who its creator or recipient was.   
 While this definition is quite broad, it should be qualified to require a clear 
association between data and the physical or mental health status of a particular 
individual.  Recall the above example of a grocery store selling non-prescription 
medication, vitamins, or dietary supplements.210 Do records of purchases of such items 
constitute “health information”?  On the one hand, data miners may be able to infer the 
existence of particular diseases from a series of seemingly unrelated purchases.  Buying a 
combination of high calorie dietary supplements such as “Ensure,” pain medication, and 
particular vitamins could indicate that an individual has AIDS or cancer.  On the other 
hand, many substances can be utilized for a broad spectrum of conditions, ranging from a 
headache to post-surgical care, and many items are bought for use by persons other than 
the purchaser.  The fact of the sale does not clearly reveal specific information 
concerning a particular individual’s health status.  Consequently, records of sales of non-
prescription health related goods should not be considered to be covered by HIPAA even 
if they are maintained in electronic form.211 We therefore recommend that “health 
information” be defined as “any information, recorded in any form or medium, that 
clearly relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an 
individual, the provision of healthcare to an individual, or the past, present, or future 
payment for the provision of healthcare to an individual.” 
Because we cannot anticipate every circumstance that will arise and require 
interpretation of the regulatory standards, we cannot provide comprehensive guidance 
concerning the meaning of “health information” in every hypothetical instance.  Further 
elucidation of the Privacy Rule’s requirements will be achieved over time through further 
guidance provided by HHS and the courts in response to specific controversies.212 
3. Uses and Disclosures 
The new definition of “covered entity” would render all of the privacy 
regulations’ provisions applicable to anyone who knowingly transmits or maintains 
electronic PHI for any business purpose related to the substance of the PHI.  A 
particularly significant section of the Privacy Rule is the “uses and disclosures” 
provision,213 which prohibits the utilization and dissemination of PHI without the 
patient’s consent except in specific circumstances that generally relate to medical 
treatment or obligations established by law.214 With an expanded definition of “covered 
entity,” this provision would have a dramatically greater impact because it would 
constrain many more parties handling PHI.  This consequence is a salutary development 
that will provide much more meaningful protection for individually-identified health 
 
209 S. 1262, at Sec. 2901 (3). 
210 See supra Part IV.A.1. 
211 PHI that is inferred by data miners from such records and is used for business purposes would, however, 
be covered under our definition. 
212 See infra Part IV.A.3 (discussing means of contacting HHS). 
213 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (2005). 
214 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(a) & 164.512  (2005). 
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information.   Employers, life insurers, marketers, retailers and others could not use PHI 
or disclose it to third parties without obtaining the consent of the data subjects. 
The required contents of covered entities’ notice of privacy practices, including 
use and disclosures, are specified in the federal regulations.215 The regulations also 
require that each authorization be signed and dated by the data subject.216 The 
regulations, however, do not instruct covered entities to alert data subjects to the fact that 
a risk of unauthorized disclosure will exist no matter what security measures are 
implemented.  Because awareness of the risk could be essential to individuals’ decision-
making and provision of meaningful consent, we recommend that the regulatory notice 
provision be amended to require that covered entities include a statement such as “despite 
our efforts to safeguard your privacy, a risk remains that your electronically-stored PHI 
will be disclosed without authorization because of an unanticipated security failure.”217 
Individuals who sign an authorization containing this statement will be empowered to 
conduct their own risk analysis and to make a more educated decision about consent. 
The expanded prohibition will adversely affect marketing218 and data mining 
operations, but it will not eradicate them.    Covered entities that wish to sell PHI would 
have to obtain consent from those whose data is disclosed,219 but this may willingly be 
given if the request is carefully worded.  For example, many individuals might provide 
authorization if they are told that their information “will be used to identify products that 
will better fit your needs.”  Data miners that garner information from sources other than 
the person to which it relates would likewise need to obtain consent for every sale of their 
lists.  To simplify matters, a “do not market list,” similar to the “national do not call list” 
that relates to phone solicitations could be constructed. 
The Privacy Rule details numerous exceptions to the use and disclosure 
prohibition, all of which would apply to the newly covered entities.220 These exemptions 
include, among others, uses and disclosures without consent that are:  1) required by law;  
2) necessary for public health activities, 3) relate to victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic 
violence; 3) required for purposes of health oversight activities; 4) necessary for judicial 
and administrative proceedings 5) required for law enforcement purposes; 6) necessary to 
avert a serious threat to health or safety; and 7) needed for specialized government 
functions.221 It is possible that other, unanticipated exceptions will be necessitated by 
 
215 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (b) (2005). 
216 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(c)(1)(vi) (2005). 
217 Unfortunately, covered entities will not be able to quantify the risk, such as by stating that the risk is one 
in a hundred or a thousand. 
218 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.508 (3) (2005) (establishing that covered entities must obtain consent for any use or 
disclosure of PHI for marketing purposes with very limited exceptions). 
219 See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning 
the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, L 201 
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 37, 41-42 (2002) (stating that “[i]f the party collecting 
the data from the subscriber or any third party to whom the data have been transmitted wishes to use the 
data for an additional purpose, the renewed consent of the subscriber is to be obtained” and that “[w]hen 
electronic contact details are obtained, the customer should be informed about their further use for direct 
marketing in a clear and distinct manner, and be given the opportunity to refuse such usage.”). 
220 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502, 164.512 (2005) (detailing currently permitted uses and disclosures). 
221 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2005).  By comparison, the European Union Privacy Directive, which applies to 
all entities processing numerous categories of data, allows the processing of private information under the 
following circumstances:  1) the data subject has consented to the processing; 2) processing is necessary for 
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the expansion of the “covered entities” definition.  These may be identified through 
public input provided during the notice and comment period that will follow the proposal 
of the amendments delineated in this Article.222 
In addition, the HHS website, http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/hipaa, establishes an 
avenue for communicating with the agency concerning comments and questions.  
Specifically, it provides:   
…you may submit an e-mail by clicking on the mailbox (OCRPrivacy@hhs.gov). 
Individual responses will not be provided, however, we will address concerns 
of general interest through development of new FAQs or other guidance for 
inclusion on our web site. As an alternative, you may call the HIPAA toll-free 
number at (866) 627-7748. 
 
Thus, inquiries could be submitted to HHS concerning the permissibility of particular 
uses and disclosures, whether certain data constitutes “health information,” and other 
matters requiring clarification. 
 4. Alternatives to Revising the Privacy Rule  
An alternative approach to modifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule would be to 
amend a large number of laws that govern the behavior of actors who might pose a threat 
to medical privacy.  For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act places boundaries 
upon the timing, content, and use of employer-conducted medical inquiries and 
examinations.223 It does not, however, address the permissibility of acquiring medical 
data from third parties or the security measures that must be applied to any health records 
possessed by employers.224 This provision could be revised to indicate explicitly that it is 
impermissible for employers to obtain health information about applicants or employees 
without the informed consent of the individuals in question and to address the security of 
electronic medical data.  By way of a second example, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
requires financial institutions to safeguard the confidentiality of their customer’s 
nonpublic personal information225 but allows for its disclosure in a variety of 
 
purposes of employment law; 3) the data subject is unable to provide authorization and processing is 
necessary to protect the vital interests of the individual in question or a third party; 4) processing is done by 
a foundation, association or other non-profit-seeking body for its own purposes, and no data is disclosed to 
third parties without consent; 5) the data is made public by its subject or is necessary for purposes of a legal 
claim; or 6) processing is required for medical reasons.  EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE, article 8.  See also Theo 
Hooghiemstra, The Implementation of Directive 95/46/EC in the Netherlands, with Special Regard to 
Medical Data, 9 EUROPEAN J. HEALTH L. 219, 219-220 (2002) (discussing the Netherland’s Personal Data 
Protection Act and its exceptions); Andrew Charlesworth, Implementing the European Union Data 
Protection Directive 1995 in UK Law:  The Data Protection Act 1998, 16 GOVT. INFO. QUARTERLY 203, 
216-17 (1999) (discussing the UK Data Protection Act of 1998 and the uses and disclosures permitted by 
the law). 
222 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements for proposed 
administrative rules). 
223 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2000). 
224 Id. 
225 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000). 
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circumstances.226 This law too could be tightened to establish a more rigid prohibition of 
PHI disclosure and to instruct financial institutions to employ appropriate security 
safeguards for computerized PHI.   
Nevertheless, a piecemeal approach to enhancing PHI protection is undesirable.  First, 
from a practical standpoint, legislatures are unlikely to revisit numerous statutes in order 
to address PHI issues.  Second, the process of revising multiple laws to include detailed 
security mandates would be extremely cumbersome.  Finally, a statute-by-statute 
approach is likely to lead to inconsistencies in levels of protection furnished by different 
laws and to the introduction of new ambiguities in statutory language that will require 
judicial interpretation.  By contrast, a revision of the HIPAA Privacy Rule will provide a 
comprehensive repair to the law.  Broadening the definitions of “covered entity” and 
“health information” will significantly augment the efficacy of the HIPAA Security Rule 
in particular and the Privacy Rule in general and will address many additional threats to 
health information privacy. 
B. Allowing for Meaningful Inquiry Regarding the Origins and Uses of PHI 
As explained earlier, the HIPAA privacy regulations allow patients to inspect and 
obtain copies of their PHI from covered entities.227 So long as the only entities covered 
by HIPAA are health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers, the 
origins and uses of the documents should generally be obvious from the documents 
themselves and the party from which they were obtained.  However, if the privacy 
regulations are expanded, as we recommend, to cover any person who knowingly stores 
or transmits individually identifiable health information in electronic form for any 
business purpose related to the substance of such information, it will become important 
for individuals to be able not only to have access to PHI that is possessed by others, but 
also to establish the provenance of the data and the manner in which it is used.  This 
evidence will be vital for purposes of determining both the extent of the injury to the 
individual and the existence of Privacy Rule breaches on the part of data sources. 
The requirement of informed consent for the use or dissemination of PHI228 should 
allow individuals to remain educated concerning the movement of their PHI in most 
cases.  A party that wishes to transmit PHI to another would need to obtain authorization 
from the affected individuals.  However, the right of inquiry described above will provide 
an added information resource in cases in which data is obtained accidentally, through the 
black market or by other unlawful means.  It will also serve as a deterrent to malfeasance.  
If a covered entity obtains PHI from a dubious source and then seeks authorization to use 
it, the data subject is likely to be surprised by the request for consent and to inquire about 
the origins of the data.  An unsatisfactory response would likely lead the data subject to 
refuse to authorize data use and thus, the purchaser will have wasted its effort and money 
in obtaining the PHI.  Furthermore, the data subject may file a complaint with the 
government and/or initiate litigation against the source that distributed the PHI in 
 
226 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2000).  For example, the statute permits disclosure “to a nonaffiliated third party to 
perform services for or functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing of the financial 
institution’s own products or services….”  15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2) (2000). 
227 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(a)(1) (2005). 
228 See supra Part IV.A.3; 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a) (2005) (discussing the requirement that covered entities 
obtain authorization for the use and disclosure of PHI).   
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violation of the regulations.  The expanded right of inquiry should, consequently, 
incentivize covered entities to engage in due diligence to determine the legitimacy of PHI 
suppliers.  Because it provides data subjects with an inexpensive means of conducting 
preliminary investigations concerning potentially inappropriate PHI disclosures, this 
mechanism should also deter regulatory violations.   
The privacy regulations allow covered entities to charge “reasonable, cost-based fees” 
f or the costs of copying, postage, and labor associated with providing individuals with 
access to their PHI.229 These charges should prevent frivolous inquiries and harassment 
of covered entities by the public.  
The process of inquiry should not be excessively burdensome for covered entities and 
could be easily automated.  Those processing PHI should establish websites to which 
individuals can submit queries concerning whether the entity possesses their PHI, and, if 
so, where it originated and how it has been used.  Generally, respondents will be able to 
develop boilerplate answers to diminish the need for individually designed narratives.  
For example, common responses might be “obtained from Hippo Direct list”230 and “used 
for marketing purposes.”     
C. Enhancing Compliance Guidelines 
The Security Rule provides a dearth of specific instructions for regulatory 
compliance, preferring to assume good judgment on the part of covered entities.231 This 
approach leaves a vacuum of guidance for health care providers with no technological 
expertise and with scarce resources with which to hire costly consultants.  It also could 
encourage malfeasance on the part of prosperous covered entities that could invest 
significant resources in ensuring the security of electronic PHI but who choose to take 
minimal precautions instead. We recommend that a number of steps be taken to provide 
more specific guidance to covered entities.   
 1. Augmenting the Implementation Specifications 
The HIPAA Security Rule offers skeletal and vague implementation specifications, 
which leave many substantial gaps and loopholes.  Consequently, a more robust scheme 
of standards and implementation specifications would significantly advance the goal of 
improved security protection for PHI.232 We focus here on a few suggested revisions. 
First, the phrase “criticality of potential risks” in the Security Rule’s “flexibility of 
approach” provisions233 and the “risk analysis” requirement in the administrative 
 
229 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.524(c)(4) (2005). 
230 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
231 See supra Part III.C; 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (b)(1) (2005) (stating that “[c]overed entities may use any 
security measures that allow the covered entity to reasonably and appropriately implement the standards 
and implementation specifications as specified in this subpart.”).  Covered entities are instructed to 
consider several factors in making their implementation decisions, including their size, complexity, 
capabilities, and technical infrastructure, the costs of the security measures, and the nature of the potential 
threats to the PHI they maintain, but they are given no assistance in making specific implementation 
decisions.  45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (b)(2) (2005). 
232 See supra Part III.C. for critique of the Security Rule’s flexible approach and vague guidance. 
233 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(ii)(4) (2005). 
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safeguards’ implementation specifications234 should be clarified to indicate that the risks 
that are to be considered are the risks to all stakeholders, including data subjects, covered 
entities, and business associates. 
Second, because effective risk analysis is crucial to a covered entity’s ability to 
choose appropriate security measures,235 the Rule must provide further guidance as to 
how risk analysis should be conducted.  A simple way to do so would be to require 
covered entities to follow the NIST Risk Management Guide for Information Technology 
Systems.236 In its response to comments provided during the proposed Security Rule’s 
public comment period, HHS cited the NIST document as authority,237 but the Security 
Rule itself has no reference to it. We recommend that the regulations’ risk analysis 
provision238 be amended to require that covered entities’ risk analyses be consistent with 
all relevant guidelines established in the NIST “Risk Management Guide for Information 
Technology Systems.”   If HHS determines at a later time that a better document exists 
because the NIST guidance has become outdated or a superior document is issued by a 
different organization, the regulatory provision would need to be changed again to refer 
to the new source.239 
Covered entities that cannot implement this guidance themselves for lack of expertise 
or resources could hire vendors to conduct the risk analysis for them or to provide them 
with a simplified form of the risk analysis procedure that is tailored to their type of entity.  
Vendors who specialize in electronic PHI security will be able to adapt the NIST 
guidance to particular categories of businesses that they service and may be able to 
accomplish the task by asking clients to fill out a relatively short questionnaire that will 
provide all necessary information.  The use of vendors for HIPAA compliance purposes 
is discussed in the next section of this article.240 
Third, the Security Rule must induce covered entities to implement the best current 
practices of the health informatics and computer security communities.241 To that end, 
the “general requirements” section242 should include an additional element, placed before 
the current fourth requirement, worded as follows:  “Make reasonable efforts to identify 
and employ best practices relating to security measures, software development, 
validation, and maintenance, and software system administration that are either 
commonly used by industry and governmental institutions or can be clearly demonstrated 
 
234 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(ii)(A) (2005).  See supra Part III.C. for critique of these provisions of the 
Security Rule. 
235 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(b)(1) (2005) (allowing covered entities discretion to choose appropriate security 
measures). 
236 Gary Stonebumer et al., Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems, NATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY (2002), available at 
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-30.pdf.
237 68 Fed. Reg. 8346 (2003). 
238 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(ii)(A) (2005). 
239 A draft international standard, ISO/DIS 27799, entitled “Health Informatics – Security management in 
health using ISO/IEC 17799,” contains a thorough discussion of threats to the security of health 
information.  If this standard is passed and the risk assessment section remains intact, the regulations may 
need to make reference to ISO 27799 as well, since, unlike the NIST guidance, it is specific to the health 
information context.  ISO 27799 is due to be published in February of 2007. 
240 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
241 See supra Part III.C. 
242 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(a) (2005). 
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to be superior to best common practices.”  The best current practices requirement would 
apply to all standards and implementation specifications.  Thus, if a covered entity 
determined that it would not be “reasonable and appropriate” for it to implement an 
addressable implementation specification,243 it would need to document why 
implementing the specification would not constitute best current practices under the 
circumstances.244 
The best current practices standard is essential to making the Security Rule 
meaningful in light of the dynamic nature of the computer security field.  The text of the 
Security Rule must maintain a level of generality and cannot dictate that covered entities 
adopt specific technologies since these could easily become outdated even before the 
regulations are enacted.  A “best practices” standard is an effective way to provide some 
guidance while maintaining sensitivity to the computer technology environment.  This 
approach is not unprecedented, since “best practices” standards are found elsewhere in 
U.S. law.  For example, a provision of the sentencing guidelines that requires the 
establishment of effective compliance and ethics programs allows small organizations to 
model their programs partly on the “best practices of other similar organizations.”245 
Similarly, an Environmental Protection Agency regulation relating to hazardous air 
pollutants instructs covered entities to design startup, shutdown, and malfunction plans 
that “reflect the best practices now in use by the industry to minimize emissions.”246 
As will be discussed below, many if not most covered entities are expected to utilize 
vendors to serve their HIPAA Security Rule compliance needs,247 and thus, they will not 
themselves need to engage in the work of determining industry standards.  Moreover, a 
plethora of information about security standards and industry practices is readily 
available through the Internet and in print, published by reputable organizations such as 
ISO, CERT, NIST, NIAP, and by software vendors.248 Both vendors and covered entities 
should easily be able to access these sources.   
Fourth, the Security Rule, which currently never once addresses software 
engineering, should include language that explicitly focuses on this essential security 
component.  The best practices provision described above, which would require covered 
entities to make reasonable efforts to identify and employ best practices relating to 
software development, validation, and maintenance and systems administration, is one 
step in the right direction.  Furthermore, the risk analysis provision249 should incorporate 
an additional statement that the risks to be considered include those associated with 
software development, operation, and maintenance.  Similarly, the risk management 
provision250 should be elucidated to state that the risks and vulnerabilities at issue include 
those linked to software development, operation, and maintenance. 
 2. Security Product Vendors and Certification 
 
243 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(i) (2005). 
244 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.306(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1) (2005). 
245 18 U.S.C. § 8B2.1 Application Notes 2(C) (2000). 
246 40 C.F.R. § 63.2852 (2005). 
247 See infra Part IV.C.2. 
248 See infra Parts IV.C.2 and IV.C.3. 
249 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(ii)(A) (2005). 
250 45 C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(ii)(B) (2005). 
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The previous section recommended a “best current practices” standard as a general 
Security Rule requirement.  The question to which we now turn is how “best practices” 
should be identified and implemented by covered entities.   
One option is for CMS, in its oversight capacity, to create a centralized repository of 
information.  CMS could maintain a website in which it describes the security measures 
and technology needed by different entities for compliance purposes, provides a current 
list of known security vulnerabilities in health information systems and the computing 
platforms they rely upon, and designates the updates and fixes that are sufficient to 
address these problems.  This approach, however, may run afoul of the notice and 
comment requirements established by the Administrative Procedure Act.251 A binding set 
of technical requirements could be interpreted to constitute rulemaking, which would 
trigger public notice and comment requirements.252 These, in turn, would generate 
significant delays and render it impossible for CMS to respond to rapidly changing 
technology and emerging security threats in a timely fashion.  The law establishes an 
exception for cases in which an “agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the 
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”253 It is possible but not certain that this exception would apply to the above-
described website. 
Several other problems are inherent in the centralized repository approach.  CMS 
would require significant additional funding and personnel resources in order to produce 
and continuously update a comprehensive set of materials for the website, and it would 
need to develop technical expertise that it does not currently have.  Furthermore, relying 
on a single source of information means that any mistakes or flaws in the information 
provided will uniformly affect all covered entities.  Finally, if the government retains 
power to designate best current practices, covered entities’ security obligations might 
vacillate significantly with changes in the political environment.  Thus, some 
administrations might articulate very demanding standards and others very lax ones. 
A superior alternative would be to allow best current practices to emerge through the 
free market. Presumably, vendors with security expertise would compete to produce the 
best possible products at a reasonable cost.  As a check against market flaws that generate  
low standards within private industry, covered entities are also instructed to research, as 
part of their best practices analysis, the computer security measures that are adopted by 
the government.254 
It is obvious that many covered entities will lack the technical knowledge and 
resources to identify best current practices and achieve Security Rule compliance and will 
require the services of computer security professionals.  To that end, it would be useful 
for CMS to maintain on its website a list of approved vendors who can be retained by 
covered entities for purposes of achieving Security Rule compliance.  The vendors would 
provide both products and technical assistance and would need to have not only technical 
expertise but also thorough familiarity with the HIPAA Security Rule.  The vendors 
 
251 5 U.S.C. §553(b) (2000) (establishing notice and comment requirements for proposed rulemaking).  
252 Id. 
253 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(3)(B) (2000). 
254 See infra Part IV.C.1 (explaining that best practices are those commonly used by industry and 
governmental institutions.). 
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would be certified based on proof that their technology is state-of-the-art and Security 
Rule compliant, that they have not been negligently responsible for any Security Rule 
breaches, and that they are able to address critical new security threats through timely 
user advisories, software improvements, and automatic installation of software 
updates.255 Vendors would also have to be certified for entities of particular sizes and 
types, since different business environments require different services.  
Covered entities that retain the certified vendors would be presumed to have complied 
with the Security Rule’s requirements, though the presumption could be rebutted by 
evidence that they failed to follow the vendor’s instructions or refused to accept the 
vendor’s recommendations.  It could also be rebutted with evidence that the covered 
entity knew or should have known that the vendor was not actually providing products 
and services that were Security Rule compliant.  This would occur in instances in which a 
vendor had been exposed by a whistleblower or the media as engaging in quackery or the 
sale of ineffective products.  The rebuttable presumption would provide protection 
against under-scrutiny by the government during the certification process and against 
vendors who might act in bad faith after they are certified in order to under-sell 
competitors or enjoy greater profits. 
Where appropriate, the vendors should provide clients with alternatives from which 
they can select, depending on their resources and capabilities.  For example, covered 
entities that are experiencing financial difficulties could be given the option of de-
identifying all of their electronic PHI.  This would entail associating a new, automatically 
generated identifier (e.g., a random number) with a patient’s electronic health record.  A 
list mapping these to patients’ names and/or social security numbers would be maintained 
only in paper form.  Covered entities that do not hire one of the approved vendors will be 
responsible for developing their own implementation measures, which must be at least as 
effective as those provided by certified vendors. 
Proposals for certification by CMS were discussed in the comments to the proposed 
Security Rule.256 CMS asserted that it did not intend to establish certification criteria for 
covered entities because it did not “have the resources to address the large number of 
different business environments.”257 Similarly, CMS refused to “assume the task of 
certifying software and off-the-shelf products” for lack of resources and expertise.258 
Instead, CMS believed that compliance assessment instruments should be developed and 
implemented by the private marketplace.259 
Certification of vendors rather than covered entities or products was not discussed in 
the comments.260 This type of certification may be less burdensome for CMS, since there 
should be fewer vendors than covered entities or products.  It is likely, however, that 
 
255 The government licenses and recertifies individuals and entities in other contexts.  For example, 
attorneys must pass the bar in order to practice law and, in many states, must earn a certain amount of CLE 
credit each year in order to retain their licenses.  Similarly, nursing homes are certified and periodically 
surveyed for purposes of recertification.  See Senator Charles Grassley, The Resurrection of Nursing Home 
Reform:  A Historical Account of the Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care 
Facilities Established in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER L.J. 267, 271-72 (1999). 
256 See Health Insurance Reform:  Security Standards, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334-01, 8352 (Feb. 20, 2003). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. 
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CMS would argue that it lacks sufficient resources and expertise to certify even vendors 
alone. 
Nevertheless, CMS should reconsider its willingness to provide some form of 
certification for compliance purposes.  Several comments to the proposed Security Rule 
emphasized the need for a list of federally approved security products and for 
certification procedures.261 This need is acute for small covered entities that do not have 
the funds, personnel, and computer proficiency to assess their Security Rule compliance 
or to determine which commercially available security products they should purchase in 
order to fulfill regulatory requirements. With vendor certification, resource-poor covered 
entities would have an accessible and reliable mechanism to achieve compliance. 
CMS acknowledged that other governmental entities are adopting the certification 
approach.262 For example, NIST and the National Security Agency (NSA) have 
established the National Information Assurance Partnership, whose goal is to help 
information technology producers and consumers meet their security testing and 
assessment needs.263 To that end, the NSA has established the TEMPEST264 
Endorsement Program, through which it provides lists of TEMPEST telecommunications 
equipment, TEMPEST test services facilities, and Commercial Off-the-Shelf 
telecommunications equipment that it has endorsed.265 Germany has embraced 
certification to a much larger extent.  Its Federal Office of Information Security (BSI)266 
provides certification services through which information technology products and 
systems are tested and certified.267 
In the comments to the proposed Security Rule, HHS stated that it encourages 
professional associations to undertake assessment and implementation activities with 
respect to HIPAA Security requirements.268 Assuming that the demand for certified 
products grows dramatically with the expansion of the “covered entity” definition, it is 
likely that some organizations will become interested in providing certification services 
for a fee.   
If CMS cannot certify the vendors themselves, it should, at the very least, certify 
those who are providing certification.  Precedent has been set for this practice as well.  
Germany’s BSI not only certifies information technology security products, but also 
accredits and licenses evaluation facilities so that they can assess information technology 
products and systems.269 ISO, a well-respected non-governmental global federation 
 
261 Id. 
262 Id. (stating that HHS has “noted with interest that other Government agencies such as the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) are working towards that end.”). 
263 See National Security Agency Central Security Service National Information Assurance Partnership, 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/niap.cfm.
264 TEMPEST, Inc. “offers TEMPEST/EMSEC and Electromagnetic Compatibility testing and design 
services in accordance with current Military, FCC, Australian & European Community Requirements.”  
http://www.tempest-inc.com/home.htm.  
265 National Security Agency Central Security Service Tempest Endorsement Program, 
http://www.nsa.gov/ia/industry/tempest.cfm?MenuID=10.2.1.3.
266 Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, http://www.bsi.de/english/index.htm.
267 Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department III:  Counter-Eavesdropping, 
Certification, Approval, Accreditation, http://www.bsi.de/english/department3.htm
268 68 Fed. Reg. 8352. 
269 Bundersanmt fur Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Department III:  Counter-Eavesdropping, 
Certification, Approval, Accreditation, http://www.bsi.de/english/department3.htm.
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established in 1946 in order to promote “the international exchange of goods and 
services” through the creation of uniform standards,270 has issued several standards that 
provide best practices guidance to those operating certification systems.271 One of these, 
ISO Guide 65, has been adopted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and is applied to 
companies operating product certification standards for livestock, meat, seed, and other 
agricultural products.272 Appropriate ISO certification guidelines could also be adopted 
by CMS so that it would not have to wholly invent its own criteria.  The certification 
bodies that are accredited by CMS would in turn certify vendors, and use of the certified 
vendors’ products would create a rebuttable presumption of HIPAA security compliance, 
as described above.  The certifying bodies would have to be recertified by CMS 
periodically to ensure their continued competence.  Furthermore, the CMS website would 
list the certifying bodies, who would then direct covered entities to the vendors they have 
approved.   
 3. Existing Tools and Emerging Technologies 
Ultimately, the electronic PHI security business could develop into a sophisticated 
international industry.273 Some tools that will facilitate regulatory compliance and 
certification already exist.     
 ISO and the International Engineering Council (IEC) have published a variety of 
standards describing sound information security practices.  The ISO/IEC 17799:2005,274 
entitled "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Code of Practice for 
Information Security Management,” establishes guidelines and “general principles for 
initiating, implementing, maintaining, and improving information security management 
in an organization” by describing best practices in these areas.275 ISO/IEC 27001:2005276 
specifies the requirements for initiating, operating, and monitoring an information 
security management system in light of the organization's overall business risks.277 
ISO/IEC 15408, known as the Common Criteria, establishes an international standard for 
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computer security specifications and evaluations.278 Finally, ISO 27799, due to be 
published in February of 2007, entitled “Health informatics – Security management in 
health using ISO/IEC 17799,” will specifically apply to health information security, if 
approved.279 
ISO, IEC, and the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineering (IEEE) have 
also developed a large number of standards and guidelines for various aspects of software 
engineering.  Notable examples include ISO/IEC 90003:2004, “Software Engineering -- 
Guidelines for the Application of ISO 9001:2000 to Computer Software,”280 which 
provides guidance for organizations concerning the acquisition, supply, development, 
operation and maintenance of computer software and related support services, and 
ISO/IEC 12207, “Information Technology—Software Life-Cycle Processes,”281 which 
establishes a system for software life cycle processes. 
In addition, at least one national organization is already devoted to research and 
development concerning Internet security.  CERT282 is a federally funded center of 
computer security expertise, operated out of Carnegie Mellon University’s Software 
Engineering Institute.  It studies Internet security vulnerabilities and long-term changes in 
networked systems and develops information and training to promote improved 
security.283 Among its other features, CERT’s website offers security alerts and 
solutions.  Certification bodies could require vendors to follow CERT’s 
recommendations in order to win certification, and covered entities not utilizing vendors 
could also rely on these for guidance. 
The list of standards and resources provided above is not meant to be exclusive, and, 
because of the ever-changing nature of technology and security threats, it would be 
impractical to attempt to develop a comprehensive list that would endure over time.  
Certification bodies should be entrusted with the task of remaining updated concerning 
guidelines and resources that are relevant to PHI security and should distribute pertinent 
information to their certified vendors.  Similarly, under the “best current practices” 
standard discussed above, covered entities that do not take advantage of certified vendors 
would be expected to follow applicable industry standards and guidelines for HIPAA 
compliance purposes.  As an additional aid, CMS should maintain on its website an 
updated, non-exclusive list of documents and Internet sources that it recommends to 
covered entities. 
It should also be noted that in the comments concerning the proposed Security Rule, 
HHS acknowledged that it is required to adopt industry standards developed by standards 
 
278 See Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation User Guide, October 1999, 
available at http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/public/files/ccusersguide.pdf;
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CombinedQueryResult.CombinedQueryResult?queryString=15408.
279 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/DIS 27799,
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=41298&scopelist=PROGR
AMME.
280 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 90003:2004,
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=35867&ICS1=35&ICS2=8
0&ICS3=.  
281 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/IEC 12207:1995,
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=21208&ICS1=35&ICS2=8
0&ICS3=.  
282 See Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute CERT Coordination Center, http://www.cert.org/.
283 Id. 
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developing organizations that are accredited by the American National Standards 
Institute,284 the U.S. representative of ISO and IEC.285 In 2003, HHS concluded that the 
available security standards were not technology-neutral, were inconsistent with HIPAA, 
and were too narrow to be adopted in the final rule.286 The advent of ISO 27799, which 
will specifically address health information security,287 should cause HHS to reevaluate 
its conclusion and may require revision of the Security Rule to include the new standard’s 
adoption.  
It is reasonable to expect that implementation of the proposed changes to the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule will influence vendors to provide relatively low cost “turnkey” systems288 
for processing and maintaining PHI that will be affordable even for small businesses.  We 
anticipate that all but the largest covered entities will lack the expertise and resources to 
achieve Security Rule compliance without the assistance of an intermediary, and thus, the 
development of a market for HIPAA compliance aids is essential.   
A Google search for HIPAA security turnkey solutions reveals a number of 
organizations already purporting to provide such solutions for compliance with the  
HIPAA Security Rule.  Some offer comprehensive practice management solutions that 
combine scheduling, record-keeping, intra-office communication, and billing in a single 
application, thereby centralizing all HIPAA related electronic data.  These include: 
AdvancedMD289 and  LeonardoMD Renaissance.290 Other products offer tutorials, 
templates, documents, and aids aimed at enabling an entity to achieve HIPAA 
compliance.  Examples include New Governance HIPAA Privacy Accelerator291 and 
HipaaManager HCAT.292 Still other applications are designed for more complex 
organizations with more sophisticated technology.  Symantec BindView293 is a 
compliance management application that analyzes an organization’s current security 
profile, suggests modifications based on best-practices, and monitors and reports 
compliance-related data (e.g. who is accessing files containing PHI).294 Secure Info 
 
284 68 Fed. Reg. 8345. However, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(c)(2)(B) (2000) provides that “[i]f no standard 
setting organization has developed, adopted or modified any standard relating to a standard that the 
Secretary is authorized or required to adopt,” the Secretary may create his own standard. 
285 ANSI, A Historical Overview, http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/introduction/history.aspx?menuid=1. 
286 68 Fed. Reg. 8345. 
287 International Organization for Standardization, ISO/DIS 27799,
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueDetailPage.CatalogueDetail?CSNUMBER=41298&scopelist=PROGR
AMME.
288 Turnkey systems are “built, supplied, or installed complete and ready to operate.”  Merriam-Webster 
Online, http://www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary.
289 AdvancedMD, http://www.advancedmd.com/default.asp.
290 LEONARDOMD Online Medicine, http://www.leonardomd.com. There are two versions of this 
product:  standard and professional.  The standard package provides “entry-level practice management with 
registration, scheduling, and messaging,” and its cost starts at $150 per month with a one-time $1250 setup 
charge.  The professional package is advertised as providing “comprehensive practice management with 
scheduling, charge capture, billing, and integrated chart documentation.  Its cost starts at $300 per month, 
with a $2500 setup charge. 
291 New Governance, http://www.newgovernance.com/hpa.html
292 HipaaManager, http://www.hipaamanager.com. The standard version costs $199, the professional 
version costs $699, and the institutional version is priced at $2999. 
293Symantec, Regulation Solution HIPAA, http://www.bindview.com/solutions/regulations/hipaa.cfm.
294 Id. 
40
Compliance Authority295 claims to allow organizations to perform comprehensive self-
assessments of regulatory compliance, provides cross-references to industry standards, 
and furnishes links to validations tests, recommendations for improvement, and policy 
statements.296 It is likely that increasingly sophisticated and cost-effective tools will 
continue to be developed in response to marketplace demands for security technology. 
D. Bolstering Enforcement through a Private Cause of Action 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s lack of a private cause of action diminishes its deterrent 
and remedial powers.297 We recommend that the privacy regulations adopt the approach 
of many of the other U.S. privacy laws and the European Union Privacy Directive and 
establish a private cause of action.298 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule’s administrative penalties should be retained alongside the 
private right of litigation.  This approach will allow governmental intervention even when 
no individuals suffer injury, such as in cases in which electronic security is inadequately 
maintained but no information is actually obtained by unauthorized third parties.  It will 
also introduce the threat of private enforcement in cases that would not be prioritized by 
the government for political reasons or that the government does not have the resources 
to pursue, which may be the vast majority of cases.299 Without a private cause of action, 
covered entities may have incentive to conduct a cost-benefit analysis from which they 
conclude that the cost of compliance is great and the risk of being penalized for a 
violation is very small, which militates against aggressive investment in PHI security 
measures.300 
The dual enforcement approach of a private cause of action and administrative 
penalties is adopted by several other privacy laws.  These include the Privacy Act of 
1974,301 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,302 and the Driver’s Privacy 
Protection Act of 1994.303 Borrowing from the private cause of action provisions found 
 
295 SECUREINFO, ComplianceAuthority,
http://www.secureinfo.com/SecureInfo.WebSite.WebUI/products.complianceauthority.aspx. The website 
asserts that customers include the Department of Homeland Security, the Air Force, Hewlett Packard, and 
Genzyme. 
296 Id. 
297 See supra, Part III.D. 
298 Id.  It is well-established that defendants can be subjected to both criminal penalties and punitive 
damages for the same wrong.  See U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 331 (1998) (holding that the double 
jeopardy clause does not prohibit the institution of both a criminal prosecution and a later civil in rem 
forfeiture action); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1357-58 (Maine 1985) (holding that double jeopardy 
is not implicated when a defendant is both criminally prosecuted and required to pay punitive damages for 
the same misconduct because the latter is imposed in a private civil suit rather than a criminal action).
299 See supra notes 174-178 and accompanying text.  See also Stein, supra note __, at A01 (quoting an 
HHS administrator as acknowledging that the agency has “challenges with our resources investigating 
complaints.”). 
300 See Choi, supra note __ , at 62 (predicting that health care providers will need to expend billions of 
dollars in order to comply with the HIPAA Privacy Rule) 
301 5 U.S.C. §§552a(g) and (h)(i)(1) (2000) (establishing private cause of action and criminal penalties). 
302 18 U.S.C. §§ 2520 and 2522(c) (2000) (establishing private cause of action and civil penalties). 
303 18 U.S.C. §§ 2723 and 2724 (2000) (establishing criminal penalties and a civil cause of action). 
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in other privacy legislation, we recommend that the HIPAA statute include the following 
language:304 
(a)  Any person aggrieved by any act of a covered entity in violation of this 
section may bring a civil action in a United States District Court.305 
(b) The court may award – 
 
(1)  actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of 
$2,500; 
 
(2)  punitive damages upon proof of willful or reckless disregard of the law; 
 
(3)  reasonable attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred; 
and  
 
(4)  such other preliminary and equitable relief as the court determines to be 
appropriate.306 
In the future, Congress might consider requiring aggrieved parties to exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing lawsuits in court.  This mechanism has been 
embraced by several employment discrimination laws, which establish that potential 
plaintiffs must file charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission and receive a determination and/or a right to sue before filing a lawsuit in 
court.307 Presumably, such a system would filter out many of the weakest cases because 
lawyers and potential litigants would be discouraged by negative administrative agency  
findings and would not burden the courts with frivolous cases.  However, effective 
administrative review is dependent upon a strong network of agency offices that are 
adequately staffed to process a large volume of claims.  DHHS’s anemic HIPAA 
enforcement record308 indicates that it does not currently have such resources. 
Some cases brought by private litigants may be complex, large, and have far-
reaching impacts. If vendors or certifying bodies are suspected of being responsible for 
 
304 The private cause of action should be added to both the administrative regulations and the federal 
statute, since the means of enforcement are authorized under the statute itself.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-5 
and 1320d-6 (2003). 
305 See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (g)(1)(D) (providing for a cause of action whenever an agency 
“fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule promulgated thereunder, in such a way 
as to have an adverse effect on an individual”); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47 U.S.C. § 551(f)(1) 
(providing that “[a]ny person aggrieved by any act of a cable operator in violation of this section may bring 
a civil action in a United States District Court.”). 
306 See the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2000), for identical language. 
307 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b) & (f)(1) (2000) (Describing the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) charge filing process); Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2000)(a) (adopting Title VII’s enforcement provisions for the ADA); and 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000) (establishing that civil actions 
may not be commenced prior to the filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC). 
308 See supra notes 174-179 and accompanying text (criticizing HHS’s enforcement of HIPAA and 
reporting that as of June of 2006, the agency imposed no civil penalties on covered entities). 
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Security Rule breaches, they could be joined as defendants309 under theories of 
negligence or fraud310 or be brought in by covered entities as third party defendants.311 In 
addition, cases involving Security Rule breaches that injure numerous individuals could 
generate class actions with hundreds, thousands, or even millions of plaintiffs.312 
V
CONCLUSION 
 
An abundance of evidence confirms that our private health information faces 
grave threats from a large number of sources.313 The danger of privacy violations will 
only intensify in the future with increased computerization and centralization of health 
records.314 The U.S. government, which has aggressively promoted the use of electronic 
health records,315 has responded to concerns about privacy by enacting HIPAA and its 
privacy regulations.  However, the legislation and regulations are significantly flawed 
from both legal and technical perspectives.  Focusing on the HIPAA Security Rule, we 
have presented recommendations to rectify some of its considerable weaknesses.  
The new requirements outlined in this article would need to be phased in gradually.  
Just as existing covered entities were given several years to prepare for compliance with 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule,316 new covered entities should be given the same courtesy.  
Moreover, time will pass before a sufficiently advanced health information security 
industry develops that will make effective and affordable products readily available for 
covered entities.  The DHHS Secretary should determine a reasonable compliance 
deadline for the newly introduced provisions.    
A public education campaign would need to be initiated to educate the public about 
its rights under the revised regulations and to educate newly covered entities about their 
obligations.  Similar efforts were made when the original privacy regulations were 
enacted.317 
309 See FED. R. CIV. P. 20 for discussion of permissive joinder of parties. 
310 See FED. R. CIV. P. 18 for discussion of permissive joinder of claims and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for a 
discussion of supplemental jurisdiction, which allows tort claims to be joined to related federal statutory 
claims in some circumstances. 
311 See FED. R. CIV. P. 14 for discussion of third party practice and 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) for a discussion of 
supplemental jurisdiction in federal court cases asserting a federal statutory claim. 
312 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 for discussion of class action requirements. 
313 See supra Introduction. 
314 Stein, supra note __, at A01 (stating that “[p]rivacy advocates say large, centralized electronic databases 
will be especially vulnerable to invasions, making it even more crucial that existing safeguards be 
enforced.”).  
315 Terry & Francis, supra note __, at 1 (noting that in April of 2004, President Bush announced a plan to 
ensure that Americans’ health records are computerized within ten years); Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan 
Talbott, Compelled Disclosure of Health Information: Protecting Against the Greatest Potential Threat to 
Privacy, 295 JAMA 2882 (2006) (discussing the creation of the Nationwide Health Information Network 
pursuant to President Bush’s call for the promotion of interconnected electronic health records); Office of 
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (ONC), Goals of Strategic Framework 
available at http://www.hhs.gov/healthit/goals.html (Dec. 2004) (discussing the goal of computerizing 
health records in order to promote “workflow efficiencies” and improved patient care). 
316 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2005) (establishing compliance deadlines). 
317 See e.g. Jonna Lorenz, Summit explains new health care rules, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, January 15, 
2002, at 7A (reporting that “[a]bout 300 people gathered at the Kansas Expocentre . . . to learn about the 
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The HIPAA Privacy Rule represents a significant regulatory effort on the part of the 
U.S. government and has generated emotional and often negative responses from the 
American public.318 The recommendations detailed in this Article should render the 
HIPAA Security Rule in particular and the HIPAA Privacy Rule in general far more 
meaningful.  They should benefit both patients whose privacy and autonomy are at stake 
and organizations seeking guidance concerning compliance requirements.  It is only with 
rethinking some of HIPAA’s statutory and regulatory provisions that electronic PHI will 
truly constitute protected health information. 
 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and what they should do to get their health care 
organizations into compliance with that legislation.”); Alliance of health care experts offers HIPAA 
Compliance Program to local companies, DAILY REC. OF ROCHESTER, Dec. 26, 2003, at __ (reporting that 
“[t]he Alliance for HIPAA Compliance, a diverse and well-integrated team of healthcare attorneys, 
consultants and administrators who are experts in HIPAA issues, offered a program to assist companies in 
becoming HIPAA compliant.”). 
318 While the HIPAA statute was passed in 1996, the privacy regulations took years to develop and did not 
become effective until 2003.  45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2005).  When it first published its proposed Rule, 
DHHS received 2,350 public comments about it.  68 Fed. Reg. 8335 (2003).  The Rule’s enforcement 
provisions were not finalized until 2006.  71 Fed. Reg. 8390 (2006).  See also SOLOVE supra note __, at 70 
(discussing the controversial nature of the HIPAA regulations). 
